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ABSTRACT 
 
Researcher: David Ronald Freiwald 
Title: THE EFFECTS OF ETHICAL LEADERSHIP AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY CULTURE ON SAFETY OUTCOMES 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2013  
This dissertation investigated the relationship among ethical leadership, an ethical 
workplace climate, safety culture, safety behaviors, and measured safety outcomes of 
workers in the high reliability organizations of aviation and healthcare.  The primary 
objective was to develop a model linking these factors and assess their fit within the 
model.  A secondary objective was to examine differences between the two populations.  
In this study, a 101-item instrument was used to collect and analyze employee responses 
on ten factors comprising the model.  Structural equation modeling – path analysis was 
used for testing and evaluating relations using a combination of statistical analysis and 
qualitative assumptions.  The model evolution allowed the improvement of the data fit; 
the best-fit model accounted for the data and was used to qualify conclusions. 
Data from 837 employees was used to develop a model in which ethical leadership 
predicted occupational injuries and ethical workplace climate, moderated by safety 
climate to predict safety related events.  To assess the difference between employment 
samples, an ANOVA was conducted.  Although significant differences at both the item 
level and the factor level existed, the model fit was not significantly different between the 
aviation and healthcare samples.  An unmediated path was found between the constructs 
of ethical leadership and occupational injuries that improved model fit and possessed 
vi 
greater weighting than the hypothesized mediated path.  Highly weighted paths between 
the ethical workplace climate and safety climate constructs were also present in the 
model.  Together, these findings demonstrate that perceptions of an ethical workplace 
climate can yield significant impact upon an organization’s safety culture while 
workplace perceptions of ethical leadership are directly related to safety outcomes.  This 
relationship provides a novel method for the prediction and mitigation of potential 
workplace mishaps.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of safety in the workplace remains a critical issue for the U.S. economy.  
In 2012, 4,609 deaths resulted from workplace injuries and those deaths were 
accompanied by an additional 2.8 million non-fatal injuries (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2012).  These work related incidents cost an estimated $176.9 billion including losses of 
wage and productivity, administrative and medical costs, and loss of operating capital 
(National Safety Council, 2011).  A clearer view of the contributing factors to workplace 
injuries is therefore important given both the number of human losses and the 
consequential cost to both the economy and the affected organizations (Parboteeah & 
Kapp, 2008).  As a result, the research interest on workplace safety remains strong 
(Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Shannon, Mayr, & Haines 1997; Zacharatos, 
Barling, & Iverson, 2005). 
Although inquiries into predictors of workplace safety are numerous, there are 
comparatively few studies (see McKendall, DeMarr, and Jones-Rikkers (2002), and 
Parboteeah and Kapp (2008) that have examined the link with ethics.  McKendall et al. 
(2002) examined how the various components of an ethics program were linked to 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) violations.  While the authors stated that 
the presence of the constituent elements of an ethical program should correlate with 
fewer OSH Act violations, their data showed that this relationship was not significantly 
present.  Indeed, McKendall et al. (2002) suggested that the ethical compliance programs 
in 108 companies studied might actually deflect attention from illegal activities rather 
than promote legitimate activities. 
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The role of safety climate and leadership as antecedents for safety related 
behavior and injuries has been previously explored in the literature.  In safety studies by 
Zohar (2002a; 2002b), for example, the role of leadership has been emphasized as a 
factor in improving safety.  Additionally, Barling, Loughlin, and Kelloway (2002) have 
focused on the effects of transformational leadership in safety promotion.  Studies in 
occupational safety have also examined the role of safety climates in the promotion of 
safety behaviors (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Griffin & Neal, 
2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2004). 
This dissertation investigated the relationship among ethical leadership, an ethical 
workplace climate, safety culture, safety behaviors, and measured safety outcomes in 
workers in the high reliability organizations of aviation and healthcare.  The primary 
objective was to develop a model linking these factors and assessing their fit within the 
model.  A secondary objective was to examine the two populations, make comparisons 
between them, and make comparisons as an aggregate. 
Significance of the Study 
This study was the first investigation of the effects of ethical leadership and an 
ethical workplace climate on measurable safety outcomes.  As the adoption of safety 
management systems becomes mandatory in more areas of aviation, safety outcomes will 
be measured and reported to regulatory agencies for organizations of all sizes and types 
for the first time.  The development of ethical leadership and an ethical workplace 
climate may represent a comparatively low-cost intervention for positive safety 
outcomes.  The methods used in this investigation provided a unique opportunity for 
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examining (a) the relationship between ethics and safety, and (b) whether interventions 
are warranted. 
Statement of the Problem 
To date, the relationship among ethical leadership, an ethical workplace climate, 
and safety outcomes are not thoroughly understood.  The identification of a relationship 
demonstrates avenues of future investigation for quantifiable safety improvement in high-
reliability organizations.  Prior to this study, Mullen (2005) demonstrated some of the 
relationships in the hypothesized model but none has involved study of the relationships 
among ethical leadership, an ethical workplace climate, safety culture, safety behaviors, 
and measured safety outcomes, or provided a pathway for analysis.  At the time of this 
study, no works appear in the literature that specifically examine the roles of ethical 
leadership and an ethical workplace climate on safety outcomes in high-reliability 
organizations.  
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to establish the relationship among ethical 
leadership, an ethical workplace climate, and occupational injuries.  The study (a) created 
an empirical model of ethical leadership, ethical workplace climate, safety climate, safety 
participation, safety compliance, safety related events, and occupational injuries,  
(b) evaluated the model on a sample of aviation and healthcare workers, and  
(c) examined the results using structural equation modeling.  For this study, a 101-item 
instrument was used to collect and analyze employee responses on the seven factors 
comprising the model. 
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Research Questions 
The research addressed three questions about the relationship between employee 
perceptions of ethics and measured safety outcomes.  First, could an effective model be 
developed linking ethical leadership and an ethical workplace climate with occupational 
injuries?  Second, if so what was the strength of that model?  Third, how was the model 
moderated or mediated by measures of organizational safety?  The hypothesized 
theoretical construct, informed by the literature, is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Theoretical construct. The relationship among measurements of ethics, 
organizational safety measurements, safety related events, and occupational injuries 
proposed for investigation. 
 
 
Delimitations 
This study did not attempt to address all possible occupational injuries or ethical 
workplace conditions.  Rather, it focused only upon those conditions likely to be 
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5 
encountered in the population workplace.  Although not every condition was examined, 
those conditions that were examined were hypothesized to be representative of the 
constructs under examination. 
Data collection occurred from discrete employee groups that were thought to be 
the most likely to have the potential to experience the types of occupational injuries 
surveyed in the instrument.  Thus, the relationships pertain only to the employee groups 
studied and may not be generalizable to other employee groups within the same 
organization. 
Data for this study were limited to those U.S. air carriers and hospitals that 
participated and were willing to grant access for this study.  Data collection was 
purposefully limited to a one-month period from four airlines and two regional hospital 
organizations.  Employees who were less likely to sustain occupational injuries in the 
course of their primary job functions were purposefully excluded in the preparation of the 
participation invitations.  In the aviation domain, pilots, administrative support personnel, 
and management were excluded.  In the healthcare domain, attending and resident 
physicians, administrative support personnel, and management were likewise excluded.  
These populations are addressed in more detail in Chapter III. 
Finally, it was not within the scope of this study to investigate safety related 
events or occupational injuries from third-party data sources.  Though the study was 
limited to self-reported data, the ultimate value exists in the relationship between the self-
reporting of events and that same individual’s perception of ethical leadership and ethical 
workplace climate.  These perceptions form the basis of the structural model. 
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Limitations and Assumptions 
Although the model for this study tested and estimated relationships among the 
constructs, the results may not be generalizable beyond the sample as this study was the 
first investigation of a model linking ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate to 
occupational injuries.  Factor analysis following data collection resulted in modification 
of the structural model. 
The 99 parameters representing the seven factors described in Chapter II were 
taken from existing instruments that were used in their entirety, albeit in a randomized 
order.  No modifications to the instrument items occurred in creating the composite 
instrument in Appendix C. 
The concepts of ethical leadership and an ethical workplace climate are highly 
subjective and were measured as the perceptions of the employee respondent.  Neither the 
instrument nor the study differentiated among levels of management relative to the 
respondent, as further described in Chapter II. 
List of Acronyms 
-2LL Negative two log likelihood; also called deviance 
AGFI Adjusted goodness of fit index 
Amos IBM® SPSS® Amos SEM software package 
CFI Comparative fit index 
CMIN Minimum discrepancy, or model chi-square 
CRM Crew resource management 
EL Ethical leadership factor 
EL(n) Ethical leadership scale item n 
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EWC(n) Ethical workplace climate scale item n 
EWCF1 Ethical workplace climate factor one (regulations) 
EWCF2 Ethical workplace climate factor two (idealized ethos) 
EWCF3 Ethical workplace climate factor three (self-interest) 
EWCF4 Ethical workplace climate factor four (personal morality) 
FIML Full information maximum likelihood 
GFI Goodness of fit index 
HRO High reliability organization 
ICS Index of Consumer Sentiments 
IFI Incremental fit index 
IV Independent variable 
MI Modification indices 
ML Maximum likelihood estimation 
NFI Normed fit index 
NNFI Non-normed fit index; also called Tucker Lewis index 
OI Occupational injuries factor 
OI(n) Occupational injuries scale item n 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
OSH Act Occupational Safety and Health Act 
PCFI Parsimony comparative fit index 
PNFI Parsimony normed fit index 
RFI Relative fit index 
RMSEA Root mean square error of approximation 
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SCli(n) Safety climate scale item n 
SCliF1 Safety climate factor one (proactive) 
SCliF2 Safety climate factor two (outcomes) 
SCom Safety compliance factor 
SCom(n) Safety compliance scale item n 
SEM  Structural equation modeling 
SEM-PA  Structural equation modeling – path analysis 
SPar Safety participation factor 
SPar(n) Safety participation scale item n 
SRE Safety related events factor 
SRE(n) Safety related events scale item n 
SRMR Standardized root mean residual 
TEM Threat and error management 
TLI Tucker Lewis index; also called non-normed fit index 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This chapter describes the review of literature related to the study, including 
ethics, ethical leadership, ethical workplace climate, the effects of leadership on 
employee attitudes, measures of organizational safety, and safety related events.  The 
theoretical construct presented in Figure 1 shows the relationship among the ethical 
constructs of leadership and workplace climate and the constructs of safety related events 
and occupational injuries, a relationship that has not been explored in the literature.  The 
mediating and moderating roles of the organizational safety measurements, safety 
climate, safety participation, and safety compliance, are of particular interest in the 
formation of a model for the evaluation of the effects of the ethical constructs on safety 
outcomes. 
Ethics 
All persons must make ethical choices; often times these choices seem so easy 
that they are barely distinguishable as choices in themselves (LaFollette, 2007).  At other 
times, these ethical choices are confounding.  Doubtless, some people are oblivious to 
moral questions; they simply act in pursuance of their own interests, never caring how 
their actions affect others (LaFollette, 2007).  Yet when one starts thinking systematically 
about practical ethical issues, one begins to theorize morally (LaFollette, 2007).  Too 
often such moral theorization is seen as an abstract pursuit of the philosopher and 
academic (LaFollette, 2007).  However, ethics grows out of, informs, and is informed by 
everyday moral choices by everyday people (Rachels, 2002).  In contrast to these 
individual choices, formal ethical theories are more organized, more structured attempts 
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to morally theorize.  Since they are more systematic, familiarity with them can help an 
agent place ethical choices within a broader context, to see how each choice is related to 
other practical ethical issues, and to think about the logical consequence of positions held 
(Singer, 1993). 
The central tension of theoretical moral philosophy is the idea that there are two 
different types of ethical considerations, consequences and rules.  These inevitably are in 
conflict (Scheffler, 2004).  Most rational agents assume that they can legitimately employ 
both types, for when one builds a house “it is not the case that we must use a hammer or 
we must use a saw” (LaFollette, 2007, p. 20).  Just as both tools must be used to effect 
sound construction so too must both considerations be taken in pursuit of ethical actions.  
The foundation of normative ethics is thus formed by the ethical considerations of 
consequences and rules.  Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics that 
investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, 
morally speaking (Rachels, 2002).  While pursuit of this argument is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it does serve to illustrate the dichotomous nature of ethical decision-making 
that faces an agent.  It is the real-world application of ethics that this study seeks to 
investigate. 
Philosophers who have articulated a number of competing ethical theories have 
traditionally addressed the question of what makes an act moral or immoral.  Consistent 
with a goal of wide applicability, researchers such as Bentham (1970) choose to employ a 
rule-based utilitarian approach in their classification of leader behaviors.  This approach 
was selected because it conforms to the manner in that contemporary Western civilization 
articulates its laws and behavioral norms.  In brief, utilitarianism is a consequentialist 
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theory, thus implying that a person can use utilitarian concepts to evaluate acts according 
to the consequences they produce (Bentham, 1970).  The rule-based utilitarianism applied 
here labels an act wrong or unethical if it violates explicit or implicit rules that, if 
followed by all, would maximize outcomes for the majority of individuals (Rachels, 
2002). 
In addition to allowing for morally neutral acts, rule-based utilitarianism also 
includes a class of acts known as supererogatory.  Supererogatory acts are those that may 
be described as morally commendable, but not morally required (Urmson, 1958).  That is, 
the omission of a supererogatory behavior is not unethical, although performance of the 
behavior is morally desirable.  For example, many Americans might consider a bystander 
entering a burning building to search for victims to be a supererogatory act because the 
actor is under no moral obligation to endanger herself or himself for the sake of others. 
The concept of supererogatory acts is important in the assessment of leader 
integrity.  If one is to label as unethical the omission of some positive behavior, the 
positive behavior in question must be morally required, not supererogatory.  For example, 
potential survey items asking subordinates whether their supervisors would engage in 
whistle blowing are rejected on the theoretical grounds that such behavior could be 
considered supererogatory because the whistle blower is not morally required to risk the 
negative consequences entailed by the behavior (Craig & Gustafson, 1988).  Thus, most 
of the items generated for the instrument describe leader behaviors that are clearly 
unethical, rather than positive or desirable. 
Rachels (2002) held that the term ethics represent two concepts.  First, ethics 
refers to well-founded standards of right and wrong that counsel what humans ought to 
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do, generally in terms of rights, responsibilities, and benefits to society, justice, or 
specific virtues.  Ethical standards also include those standards that direct virtues of 
righteousness, compassion, and loyalty.  Such standards are adequate standards of ethics 
because they are supported by consistent and well-founded reasons (Andre & Velasquez, 
1987).  Secondly, ethics refers to the study and formation of one’s ethical standards.  In 
many situations, mindsets, codes, and social norms can deviate from that which is ethical 
(Andre & Velasquez, 1987).  Thus, it becomes necessary to continuously examine one’s 
standards to ensure that they are reasonable and well founded (Rachels, 2002).  Ethics 
therefore, also means that the continuous effort of studying one’s own moral beliefs and 
one’s moral conduct while endeavoring to ensure that the individual, and the 
organizations the individual helps to shape, live up to ethical standards that are 
reasonable and solidly-based (Andre & Velasquez, 1987).  Central to an individual 
shaping institutions is the notion of ethical leadership (Brown & Treviño, 2006). 
Ethical Leadership 
Brown and Treviño (2006) described ethical leadership as important because of 
the outcomes it is thought to influence.  A leader's behavior is often emulated by 
subordinates because leaders are perceived as attractive and credible models of normative 
and appropriate behavior, an action that is consistent with theories of social learning.  
Additionally, leaders who were considered to be ethical convey the importance of ethical 
standards in the workplace and utilize systems that hold employees accountable for 
conduct.  The observed outcomes of others, again consistent with social learning theory, 
serves to inform employees about rewards and discipline without first-hand experience 
(Brown & Treviño, 2006; Brown, Treviño & Harrison, 2005).  Brown and Treviño 
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(2006) proposed that the ethical leader via modeling and other vicarious processes 
influenced the ethics-related conduct, such as decision-making by employees, pro-social 
behaviors, and counterproductive behaviors.  Ethical leaders were also found to influence 
employee behavior, both positively and negatively, as the result of employee’s perception 
in terms of social exchange with the leader as part of the employee’s relationship with 
that leader (Brown & Treviño, 2006). 
Limited qualitative research has been conducted that examines ethical leadership 
as perceived by subordinates within an organization.  Howell and Avolio (1992) 
discussed differences among charismatic leaders, both ethical and unethical, while 
Treviño, Brown, and Hartman (2003) sought participant’s descriptions of the 
characteristics of ethical leadership.  Still, there is little research that explores the ethical 
leadership construct in terms of derivations and outcomes. 
The use of survey research has found relationships between perceptions of 
leadership effectiveness and perceptions of leader integrity (Den Hartog, House, Hanges, 
Ruiz-Quintanilla, & Dorfman, 1999; Kouzes & Posner, 1993; Posner & Schmidt, 1992).  
The idealized influence of a transformational leader has been directly linked to 
perceptions of honesty and integrity (Avolio, 1999; Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999).  Taken 
literally, it can be inferred that ethical leadership is defined by these two leadership traits 
of honesty and integrity.  However, a study by Howell and Avolio (1992) determined that 
honesty was only one of several traits that distinguished ethical and unethical charismatic 
leaders from each other.  Additionally, Treviño, Hartman, and Brown (2000) found that 
these integrity traits only contributed to one factor of ethical leadership.  Treviño, 
Hartman, and Brown (2000) also found that ethical leadership required a moral leader 
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aspect that involved multiple visible behaviors that do not necessarily emerge solely from 
personal attributes.  Thus, while leader trustworthiness and honesty certainly contribute 
to ethical leadership, they are unlikely to be an identical construct. 
The position in which leaders find themselves relative to subordinates allows 
leaders to apportion justice because of their authority, or because of their control over 
individuals, resources, and organizational direction.  Tyler (1986) believed that the 
support of leaders by subordinates is largely based on perceptions of fairness, with people 
acting as “naive moral philosophers, judging the actions of leaders against abstract 
criteria of fairness” (p. 309), while subsequent research has supported this relationship 
(Alexander & Ruderman, 1987; Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Tyler, 
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985).   
Bies and Moag (1986) described the concept of interactional fairness and the 
treatment of employees with respect and dignity, perhaps the most appropriate proxy for 
fairness in the context of supervisory-subordinate leadership.  Additionally, the 
perception of a just workplace is often predicated upon the employee’s belief that leaders 
make decisions that are perceived as fair.  Yukl (2002) has described improved 
satisfaction and performance by subordinates when a leader is perceived to be considerate 
in employee-leader interactions.  Accordingly, it becomes reasonable to ask if respectful 
treatment or the demonstration of consideration is sufficient to define ethical leadership. 
Treviño et al. (2003) and Treviño et al. (2000) determined that perceptions of 
ethical leadership were formed by leader behaviors; specifically, equitable treatment of 
subordinates and a general concern for people.  Beyond these notions of fairness, Avolio 
(1999) described principled decision making as an essential element of ethical leadership.  
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The establishment of ethical expectations for subordinates (Treviño et al., 2003) and the 
use of both punishment and reward to enforce accountability (Gini, 1998; Treviño et al., 
2003) were also found to define ethical leadership by subordinates.  While a relationship 
between the perceptions of considerate and fair treatment toward subordinates and the 
construct of ethical leadership certainly exists, it is not an exclusive relationship. 
Ethical Workplace Climate 
Victor and Cullen (1988) suggested that ethical climates vary along two 
dimensions.  The first dimension concerns the ethical criteria, the reasoning process by 
which ethical decisions are made.  Victor and Cullen (1988) identified three major classes 
of ethical reasoning that they term egoism, benevolence, and principle, and related these 
classes of ethical reasoning to Kohlberg’s (1984) three levels of moral reasoning: pre-
conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 
2005).  The second dimension of ethical climates involves the focus of the ethical 
reasoning, termed loci of analysis, that identifies the scope of ethical issues under 
consideration.  Here, Victor and Cullen (1988) followed social role theory (Gouldner, 
1957), distinguishing among individual-level, group-level, and societal-level concerns 
that they term individual, local, and cosmopolitan, respectively. 
While the literature on leadership has historically acknowledged the influence of 
leaders on the ethics of organizations, ethics researchers have only recently begun to 
consider this relationship explicitly.  For example, Treviño et al. (2000) discussed the 
importance of a leader’s reputation for ethical leadership, noting that “values are the glue 
that holds things together, and values must be conveyed from the top of the organization” 
(p. 128).  Dickson, Smith, Grojean, and Ehrhart (2001) suggested that the critical 
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determinant of ethical climate is the leader’s ethical behavior.  Sims and his colleagues 
(Sims, 2000; Sims & Brinkman, 2002) drew on Schein (1985) to describe how leaders 
shape and reinforce the ethical climate of an organization.  Logsdon and her colleagues 
crafted a similar argument (Logsdon & Corzine, 1999; Logsdon & Yuthas, 1997). 
Although different authors articulate slightly different processes by which a 
leader’s ethical approach affects an organization’s ethical climate, they substantially 
agree that leaders have considerable power to create and maintain ethical norms and 
processes.  Therefore, leaders create a particular kind of ethical climate (Burns, 1978; 
Logsdon & Corzine, 1999; Logsdon & Yuthas, 1997).  Additionally, conceptual work 
suggests that the individual characteristics of leaders have an impact on their 
organizations’ ethical climate (Dickson et al., 2001; Logsdon & Corzine, 1999; Logsdon 
& Yuthas, 1997; Sims, 2000; Sims & Brinkman, 2002; Treviño et al., 2000). 
A substantial conceptual literature on the relationship between leader ethics and 
organizational ethical climate exists, yet there are few works that addresses the existence 
of a specific relationship.  The conceptual research suggests a straightforward main effect 
relationship between leader ethics and ethical climate (Dickson et al., 2001; Logsdon & 
Yuthas, 1997; Sims & Brinkman, 2002).  However, leader ethics as a construct is 
expected to be related to ethical climate as a construct. 
The ethical climate types identified by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) and 
Cullen, Victor, and Bronson (1993) are used in this study.  Ethical climate refers to a 
construct of multiple workplace elements that represent organizational practices and 
procedures within the institution that define the right and wrong for the organization.  
Martin and Cullen (2006) performed a meta-analysis of the ethical climate literature that 
17 
 
17 
demonstrated the utility of the concept of ethical climate and provided evidence of the 
relationship among an ethical workplace climate and other factors including commitment 
to the organization, job satisfaction, and dysfunctional behaviors. 
Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) further separated ethical climate types within 
organizations using Merton’s (1957) sociological theories of roles and groups in 
organizations.  These ethical types form three distinct loci: individual, local, and 
cosmopolitan.  The individual locus refers to internal or self-referent moral reasoning 
(Victor & Cullen, 1988).  The local locus refers to “the social systems within which 
individuals are embedded” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 108).  Most often, this local locus 
refers to an individual’s organization or workplace.  The cosmopolitan locus refers to 
sources of moral authority or reasoning external to the local locus.  This locus may be 
represented by corporate policy, professional codes, or other social construct (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988). 
For the purpose of this study, interest in ethical climates is at the workplace level, 
or the local level in Victor and Cullen’s (1987, 1988) ethical climate terminology.  Both 
Katz-Navon, Naveh, and Stern (2005) and Neal, Griffin, and Hart (2000) have stated that 
the most important and influential elements on the safety behavior of the individual 
employee are the organization and its sub-units.  By investigating the ethical climate at 
this local level, the effects of workplace climate on the rate of injuries and safety factors, 
such as participation and promotion, can be more accurately assessed.  Most importantly, 
the climate at the workplace level is within an organization’s ability to affect change.  In 
contrast, the other loci, individual and cosmopolitan, are not considered because they do 
not necessarily represent a strong association between their measures of ethical climate 
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and safety behaviors.  Perhaps most importantly, the organization does not have the 
ability to change the individual and cosmopolitan loci. 
Schneider (1990) stated that there are strong reasons to expect a relationship 
between workplace-level ethical climates and safety in that workplace.  Schneider 
defined climates as “incumbents’ perceptions of the events, practices and procedures and 
the kinds of behaviors that get rewarded, supported and expected in a setting” (1990, 
p. 384).  Schneider further stated, “[s]ince ethical climates are concerned with issues that 
relate to workers’ overall welfare and well-being […] the ethical climate within any plant 
will provide guidance as to the appropriate safety-enhancing behavior” (1990, p. 386).  
Zohar and Luria (2004) further argued that these types of climate perceptions are useful 
in providing guidance to employees within the organization regarding behaviors that will 
be supported and/or rewarded. 
Effects of Transformational Leadership on Performance and Employee Attitudes 
Bass’ (1985) transformational leadership theory has generated considerable 
empirical research interest over the past decades.  Empirical evidence suggests that 
transformational leadership predicts positive performance outcomes in field experiments, 
field studies, laboratory studies, and meta-analytic studies (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 
1996; DeGroot, Kiker & Cross, 2000; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002; Fuller, 
Patterson, Hester, & Stringer, 1996; Hater & Bass, 1988; Howell & Avolio, 1993; Howell 
& Frost, 1989; Keller, 1992; Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Lowe, Kroeck, & 
Sivasubramaniam, 1996).  According to Judge and Piccolo (2004), more than 87 studies 
report positive relationships among transformational leadership and organizational 
outcomes. 
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Studies of transformational leadership examined the relationship among leader 
transformational behaviors, employee attitudes, and performance at both the individual 
and unit level.  In a study of 520 nurses, Avolio, Zhu, Koh and Bhatia (2004) examined 
the effects of transformational leadership on followers’ organizational commitment.  
Psychological empowerment mediated the relationship between transformational 
leadership and follower organizational commitment.  Furthermore, structural distance 
between the leader and follower, or the extent in which leadership was direct or indirect, 
also mediated the relationship between transformational leadership and followers’ 
organizational commitment. 
Barling et al. (1996) also examined the effects of transformational leadership on 
follower organizational commitment.  In an experimental study that examined both 
individual and unit level outcomes, Barling et al. (1996) demonstrated that enhanced 
transformational leadership through training yields higher subordinate ratings of 
organizational commitment, improved perceptions of leaders’ transformational 
leadership, and sales performance in banks. 
Walumbwa, Wang, Lawler, and Shi (2004) further investigated the underlying 
processes by which transformational leadership influences followers by examining the 
mechanisms through which transformational leadership influences subordinates’ 
organizational commitment, job satisfaction, and work withdrawal.  A sample of 402 
CEOs and HR managers from Chinese and Indian financial firms participated in the 
study.  Collective efficacy, defined as “each individual’s assessment of his or her group’s 
collective capability to perform job related behaviors” (Walumbwa et al., 2004, p. S1S), 
moderated the relationship among transformational leadership, work attitudes, and 
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behavior.  Transformational leadership predicted higher ratings of follower perceptions of 
collective efficacy.  Collective efficacy fully mediated the relationship among 
transformational leadership and followers’ withdrawal behavior, and partially mediated 
the relationship among transformational leadership, follower job satisfaction, and 
organizational commitment.  The findings suggest that transformational leadership plays 
a positive role in increasing collective efficacy among followers, which in turn has a 
positive impact on job satisfaction and commitment, while reducing withdrawal and 
turnover intentions.  The findings also provide empirical support for the generalizability 
of transformational leadership across various cultures. 
Most studies of transformational leadership and performance were conducted in 
settings that were relatively stable, an observation that led Bass, Avolio, Jung, and 
Berson (2003) to examine the relationship between leadership and performance within 
units that operated under high levels of stress and uncertainty.  In a sample of 72 light 
infantry rifle platoons, the researchers examined how transformational leadership, 
transactional leadership, unit potency (unit confidence to perform tasks), and unit 
cohesion (teamwork) predicted performance on a training platoon mission.  The results 
indicated that both transformational and transactional leadership ratings of sergeants and 
platoon leaders positively predicted unit performance.  This observed relationship was 
partially mediated by soldier ratings of unit potency and unit cohesion.  These findings 
suggest that the positive effects of transformational leadership may be generalized to 
stressful and challenging work settings, in addition to relatively stable environments. 
Finally, the meta-analysis by Judge and Piccolo (2004) reported that 
transformational leadership was the strongest predictor of subordinate satisfaction with 
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the employees’ leader when other types of leadership, such as transactional leadership, 
were statistically controlled.  Subordinate motivation and subordinate ratings of leader 
effectiveness were also more strongly predicted by transformational leadership than by 
other types of leadership.  The estimated true score correlation between transformational 
leadership and performance was r = 0.44, p < .05, indicating a medium correlation (Field, 
2013).  Similar findings were reported by Bass and Avolio (1993), Kirkpatrick and Locke 
(1996), and Shamir, House and Arthur (1993) in their earlier meta-analyses studies of 
transformational leadership. 
Overall, a review of the empirical research indicates that the effects of 
transformational leadership on performance and employee attitudes are well established 
in the literature.  In sum, the combined results of these observational (Judge & Piccolo, 
2004) and experimental (Barling et al., 1996) studies provide support for the validity of 
transformational leadership outcomes and suggest that the effects on performance and 
employee attitudes are generalizable across a variety of organizational settings. 
A Model of Safety-Specific Ethical Leadership 
The purpose of this study was to establish the relationship among ethical 
leadership, an ethical workplace climate, and occupational injuries.  The study:  
(a) created an empirical model of ethical leadership, ethical workplace climate, safety 
climate, safety participation, safety compliance, safety related events, and occupational 
injuries; (b) evaluated the model on a sample of aviation and healthcare workers; and  
(c) examined the results using structural equation modeling.  Although the literature 
concerning leadership has increased appreciably, only a small portion of the research has 
focused on leadership in a safety context and its prediction of safety outcomes  
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(Barling et al., 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Zohar, 2002a).  Previous 
research indicates that leadership is associated with various safety outcomes (Butler & 
Jones, 1979; Dunbar, 1975) including safety climate and safety related events (Barling et 
al., 2002; Kelloway et al., 2006; Mullen, 2005), better safety records (Hofmann, Jacobs & 
Landy, 1995; Zohar, 1980), and safety citizenship behavior (Hofmann et al., 2003).  The 
current study examines the impact of ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate on 
employee safety outcomes. 
Safety-Specific Ethical Leadership.  Unlike Williams, Turner and Parker’s 
(2000) study that examined the relationship between leadership and safety using the 
general form of transformational leadership, the leadership construct used in this study 
reflects the manner in which leaders applied ethical leadership in the workplace.  Thus, 
the construct that is examined in the theoretical model reflects a transformational 
leadership style.  As Barling et al. (2002) described, each of the four components of 
transformational leadership are relevant to improving workplace safety.  The authors 
suggest that idealized influence would encourage managers to become role models by 
doing what is right rather than what is profitable.  Furthermore, managers demonstrate 
inspirational motivation when they challenge individuals to go beyond their needs for the 
collective good and to achieve a level of safety performance that surpasses the minimum 
safety standards or that were once perceived to be unattainable (Barling et al., 2002).  
Intellectual stimulation would encourage managers to challenge employees to create 
innovative ways for approaching and solving safety related issues.  Finally, 
individualized consideration for employees would demonstrate that managers have a 
personal concern for their safety and well-being (Barling et al., 2002). 
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The theoretical model of ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate, as 
displayed in Figure 1 is formulated from the aforementioned literature.  The theoretical 
model may demonstrate that ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate are distinct 
yet correlated constructs. 
Leadership – Safety Climate – Safety Related Events – Injury Mediation 
Model.  Safety climate is a growing area of interest in the occupational safety literature.  
Perceptions of safety climate are defined as “shared perceptions of managerial policies, 
procedures and practices as indicators of concern for employees’ safety” (Zohar, 2002a, 
p. 75).  The safety climate literature addresses two main issues, namely the nature of the 
safety climate construct (Hayes, Peranda, Smecko & Trask, 1998; Zohar, 1980), and the 
relationship among safety climate and organizational outcomes such as safety knowledge 
and motivation (Griffin & Neal, 2000), safety behavior (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996) and 
workplace accidents (Zohar, 2000).  Researchers have also examined the predictors of 
safety climate and they suggest that positive safety climates are created when managers 
demonstrate a commitment to safe practices and policies within an organization (DeJoy, 
1985; Zohar, 1980).  However, the relationship among safety climate, leadership, and 
safety related outcomes remains unclear (Neal & Griffin, 2002; Zohar, 2002b) and is 
addressed in the current study. 
Leaders play an important role in shaping the perceived safety climate within a 
workplace (DeJoy, 1985; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Zohar, 1980).  As defined above, 
perceptions of safety climate are “shared perceptions of managerial policies, procedures 
and practices,” (Zohar, 2002a, p. 75) relating to safety.  These shared perceptions 
influence the employees’ actions and safety behavior in the workplace  
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(Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996).  For example, leaders who act consistently with safety-
specific transformational leadership do so by communicating high expectations regarding 
safety and focus on employee efforts to meet such expectations (Bass, 1990).  Such 
actions also contribute to an improved safety climate.  Furthermore, when leaders 
emphasize the importance of safety through their own personal commitment and become 
role models of safety, individuals’ perceptions of safety climate will also be improved.  
Showing an active and genuine interest in the safety and welfare of employees enables 
leaders to enhance the employees’ perceptions of safety climate within organizations.  
Finally, leaders who encourage employees to develop innovative ways to improve current 
safety practices and challenge them to confront beliefs about safe practices also enhance 
perceived safety climate.  Managements’ commitment to safety can also manifest itself 
through participation in occupational health and safety committees, safety training, and 
ergonomic reviews (Zohar, 1980). 
Researchers have discussed the influence of safety climate on workplace 
accidents (Dedobbeleer & BeLand, 1991; Niskanen, 1994).  In one of the first empirical 
studies that examined safety-specific transformational leadership and safety outcomes 
among workers in the food and beverage industry, Barling et al. (2002) found that 
perceptions of safety climate mediated the relationship among transformational 
leadership style and safety related events, which in turn predicted occupational injuries.  
Their research indicated that the most immediate predictor of occupational injuries was 
safety related events, rather than other organizational conditions, such as safety climate or 
safety compliance.  Safety related events are defined as close calls that occur on the job 
that may have led to an occupational injury, such as cuts, sprains, or pulled back muscle.  
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As Barling et al. (2002) highlighted, previous research on the association among 
organizational conditions and occupational injuries has revealed only modest 
relationships (Shannon et al., 1997).  Shannon et al. (1997) attributed these findings to the 
indirect relationship among various organizational conditions and injuries, and point to 
the importance of safety related events as a mediator.  Kelloway et al. (2006) replicated 
the findings of Shannon et al. (1997) in a study of young workers. 
Zohar (2000) provided evidence for the group level model of safety climate and 
the prediction of injuries, that is, climate perceptions were related to supervisory practices 
as opposed to organizational policies and procedures concerning safety.  Later, Zohar 
(2002a, 2002b) provided support for the mediating role of safety climate in a study of 
production workers.  In the latter study, the effects of transformational leadership on 
occupational injuries were mediated by three safety climate variables, the extent to which 
supervisors took preventative action, the extent to which supervisors were reactive to 
safety issues, and finally, the extent to which the supervisor prioritizes safety. 
In a longitudinal study, Neal and Griffin (2006) examined the impact of 
perceptions of safety climate and safety motivation on employee safety behavior and 
accidents.  Using a sample of 208 hospital workers, the results showed that perceptions of 
safety climate were relatively stable over a two-year period, suggesting that consistency 
may also be expected in various safety outcomes in organizations.  Furthermore, the 
results of Neal and Griffin’s study provided support for the mediating role of safety 
motivation in the relationship among perceptions of safety climate and self-reported 
safety behavior and accidents. 
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As discussed above, a growing body of data suggests that a leadership style that 
emphasizes safety - or fails to emphasize safety - predicts perceived safety climate.  A 
safety climate, in turn, correlates with safety outcomes including safety related events and 
occupational injuries (Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000, 2002b). 
Safety Compliance and Safety Participation.  Safety compliance and safety 
participation characterize two theoretical constructs that have drawn attention in the 
organizational behavior literature.  Based on Borman and Motowidlo’s (1993) model of 
job performance, Neal and Griffin (1997) proposed a model of safety performance that 
distinguishes between two dimensions of safety behavior: safety compliance and safety 
participation.  Safety compliance involves carrying out required behaviors that maintain 
workplace safety, such as following safety procedures and wearing protective safety 
equipment.  Safety participation involves behaviors that indirectly contribute to 
developing a safe work environment, such as employee initiative to voluntarily 
participate in safety activities and programs (Cree & Kelloway, 1997), helping co-
workers with safety problems, promoting the safety programs and policies, attending 
safety meetings (Neal et al., 2000), and raising safety issues with managers (Mullen, 
2005).  The important distinguishing factor lies in that compliance is typically mandated 
whereas participation is usually voluntary and initiated by employees. 
The need for employee safety participation is becoming increasingly important as 
traditional approaches to safety management, such as ergonomics, safety policies, and 
compliance, may have reached their potential in terms of improving workplace safety 
(Erickson, 2005).  For example, although important safety policies and training programs 
are legislated in the United States and Canada, the legislation does not ensure that 
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employees will comply with the policies or wear the appropriate safety equipment 
(Kelloway as cited in Belcourt, Bohlander & Snell, 2005; Mullen, 2004).  Employees 
have the discretion to decide whether or not they comply with the safety rules and 
policies, particularly when they are unsupervised.  Thus, an individual’s safety initiative 
or willingness to voluntarily participate in an organization’s safety procedures on a 
consistent basis becomes central to improving workplace safety. 
Very little is known about the factors that lead employees to engage in safety 
compliance and participatory behavior (Barling et al., 2002).  Zohar (2002a) has found 
that leadership aimed at enhancing safety compliance leads to better safety performance.  
However, the effects of particular safety leadership styles on safety compliance remain to 
be examined.  Furthermore, the effect of ethical leadership on safety participation is not 
well established in the literature.  The current study addresses these issues by examining 
the correlation among the two factors ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate 
with the two factors employee safety compliance and safety participation. 
Safety Leadership – Safety Compliance/Participation – Safety Related 
Events.  Leaders who act consistently in a safety-specific transformational manner do so 
by communicating high expectations regarding safety, show an interest in the safety of 
employees, and encourage employees to develop innovative ways to improve current 
safety practices.  All of these actions contribute to the enhancement of perceived safety 
climate and better safety performance (Barling et al., 2002).  Researchers also examined 
the impact of supportive leadership on task, or safety compliance, and contextual 
performance, or safety participation.  In a study that examined leader-member exchange 
relationships and safety citizenship behavior, Hofmann et al. (2003) found that high 
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quality leader-member relationships resulted in expanded safety citizenship role 
definitions, that is, employees’ understanding of the safety roles that are expected of 
them, and safety citizenship behavior.  Similar to behaviors that characterize 
transformational leaders, high quality leader-member relationships involve a high amount 
of leader support, openness, loyalty, instilling confidence in employees, and providing 
encouragement (Howell & Hall-Merenda, 1999; Yukl, 1998).  In high quality leader-
member relationships, employees tend to reciprocate the high quality relationship by 
enlarging their roles beyond normal role requirements, such as engaging in safety 
citizenship behaviors, with the intent of paying back their leaders.  Thus, not only will 
employees comply with safety policies by doing what is required, but they will also go 
beyond the minimum safety requirements and engage in safety citizenship behaviors. 
Hofmann et al. (2003) have described safety citizenship as discretionary individual 
behavior that is not explicitly recognized by job descriptions or reward systems and is 
focused on improving safety performance of other team members and the organization.  
Examples of safety citizenship behavior include participating in voluntary safety 
programs, making safety related recommendations about work activities, taking action to 
protect co-workers from safety hazards, reporting safety violations, and trying to improve 
safety procedures. 
High quality leader-member relationships are associated with fewer safety related 
accidents in the workplace (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999).  In a sample of 49 supervisor- 
group-leader dyads, high quality leadership was directly related to safety communication 
and safety commitment, and high quality leadership was indirectly related to fewer 
workgroup accidents.  These findings also support the notion that individuals reciprocate 
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high quality relationships with their leader by expanding their safety citizenship role 
definitions and by adopting greater safety citizenship behaviors, an example of safety 
participation.  Similarly, in a manufacturing company, Mullen (2005) found that 
employees reported a greater willingness to voluntarily raise safety issues with 
management, an action demonstrating safety participation, when the employees perceived 
their managers to be supportive of the employees and open to listening to the employees’ 
ideas about safety issues. 
Characteristic of transformational leadership, managers demonstrate inspirational 
motivation when they challenge individuals to go beyond their needs for the collective 
good, to achieve a level of safety performance that surpasses the minimum safety 
standards, or to achieve a level of safety performance that was once perceived to be 
unattainable.  Motivation is another important predictor of both safety compliance and 
safety participation (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal et al., 2000).  Through inspirational 
motivation, transformational leaders motivate employees to voluntarily participate in 
activities that increase the level of safety performance in addition to complying with 
minimum safety standards.  Overall, the growing evidence supports the relationship 
among safety-specific transformational leadership, safety compliance, and safety 
participatory behaviors.  When individuals comply with safety procedures and policies, 
they are more likely to also engage in participative safety behaviors.  Individuals, who 
comply with safety policies by doing what is required, are also more likely to go beyond 
the minimum safety requirements and engage in safety citizenship behaviors (Barling et 
al., 2002). 
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The mediating role of safety compliance in the relationship among the safety-
specific leadership constructs and safety related events is also examined in this study.  As 
discussed above, ethical leadership is expected to enhance safety compliance.  
Furthermore, this type of safety performance involves behaviors that directly contribute 
to developing a safe work environment.  Therefore, behaviors that are characteristic of 
safety compliance will lead to fewer safety related events in the workplace (Griffin & 
Neal, 2000).  For example, individuals who comply with established safety regulations 
are less likely to experience safety related events than those individuals who do not 
comply with established safety regulations.   
The relationship among safety participation and safety related events is also 
examined in this study.  Studies on the effect of individual risk perceptions on 
participation in health and safety programs illustrate that perceived risk directly predicts 
participation (Cree & Kelloway, 1997; Goldberg, Dar-el, & Rubin, 1991).  Individuals 
who experience close calls or safety related events, display higher levels of safety 
participation (Mullen, 2004).  Cree and Kelloway (1997) suggest that exposure to 
workplace accidents or safety related events strongly influences an individual’s own 
perception of risk so that their perceived risk increases as exposure to the events 
increases. 
The accident history of others also indirectly predicts an individual’s participation 
in safety programs (Cree & Kelloway, 1997).  Mullen (2004) found that perceived risks 
associated with a job tended to be heightened when an individual vicariously experienced 
or learned about an injury that occurs within the workplace.  In such cases, an individual 
is at risk of becoming injured while performing the job.  In fact, workers report that a 
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shock or close call raises safety awareness and helps them realize the potential 
consequences of unsafe behavior (Mullen, 2004).  Often the safety related events, or 
close call, resulted in the realization of the importance of safety in the workplace and 
increased the likelihood that individuals would voluntarily perform their work safely. 
The call for increased research focused on identifying factors that are associated 
with safety compliance and participation has also come from Neal and Griffin’s (2002) 
review of the safety climate literature.  Findings from Neal and Griffin (2002) support the 
relationship between safety climate and safety behavior and led them to hypothesize a 
similar relationship between safety compliance and safety participation. While Neal and 
Griffin (2002) suggested that safety climate is one of the potential predictors of safety 
behavior, they further identified other potential predictors of safety behavior including 
supportive leadership and conscientiousness.  For these reasons, they expect that climate 
will also predict safety compliance and safety participation. 
Similarly, in their 1997 model of safety climate and behavior, Neal and Griffin 
(1997) examined a variety of relationships among safety climate and other organizational 
factors.  The findings of these studies (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 1997) 
included empirical support for relationships among a variety of factors and safety 
compliance and participation.  For example, Griffin and Neal (2000) found that 
conscientiousness predicted safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety 
participation.  Furthermore, in a study of seven large mining and manufacturing 
organizations, Griffin and Neal (2000) found that perceptions of knowledge about safety 
and motivation to perform work functions safely significantly influenced self-reports of 
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task and contextual safety performance, namely safety compliance and safety 
participation. 
Hypotheses 
The use of SEM-PA allowed evaluation of the relationships between ethical 
leadership and ethical workplace climate upon safety related events and occupational 
injuries.  Of interest to this study was examining the mediating roles of safety climate, 
safety participation, and safety participation upon the relationships among ethical 
leadership and ethical workplace climate upon safety related events and occupational 
injuries.  The literature suggested that correlations might exist among workplace safety 
and several variables such as safety climate, safety participation, and safety compliance.  
The SEM-PA method allowed each relationship to be evaluated independently as well as 
to provide an overall measure of model fit.  The following hypotheses were developed to 
examine possible correlations: 
Hypothesis 1: Ethical leadership is related to an ethical workplace climate. 
Hypothesis 2: Ethical leadership is related to safety climate. 
Hypothesis 3: Ethical leadership is related to safety participation. 
Hypothesis 4: Ethical leadership is related to safety compliance. 
Hypothesis 5: An ethical workplace climate is related to safety climate. 
Hypothesis 6: An ethical workplace climate is related to safety participation. 
Hypothesis 7: An ethical workplace climate is related to safety compliance. 
Hypothesis 8: Safety climate is related to safety participation. 
Hypothesis 9: Safety climate is related to safety related events. 
Hypothesis 10: Safety compliance is related to safety participation. 
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Hypothesis 11: Safety compliance is related to safety related events. 
Hypothesis 12: Experienced safety related events are related to safety 
participation. 
Hypothesis 13: Experienced safety related events are related to occupational 
injuries. 
Hypothesis 14: There is no difference between populations of high reliability 
organizations with regard to model fit. 
Together, these hypotheses formed the basis for the proposed structural equation – path 
analysis model shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Structural Equation – Path Analysis Model. The proposed model shows the 
hypothesized relationships (H1 – H13) among ethical leadership, ethical workplace 
climate, safety climate, safety participation, safety compliance, safety related events, and 
occupational injuries. 
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Summary 
The literature suggests that ethical leadership is thought to be important because 
of the outcomes it is believed to influence.  Despite this, there are no studies in the 
literature that examine the relationship among ethical leadership and safety related 
outcomes.  Brown and Treviño (2006) proposed that ethical leaders would influence 
ethics-related conduct, such as employee decision-making, pro-social behaviors, and 
counterproductive behaviors, primarily through modeling and vicarious learning 
processes.  Treviño et al. (2003) and Treviño et al. (2000) found that leaders’ behaviors 
reflecting a concern for people and fair treatment of employees contributed to perceptions 
of ethical leadership while Avolio (1999) offers a different view of ethical leadership as 
going beyond fair treatment to include principled decision-making.  Gini (1998) suggests 
leaders use rewards and punishments to hold followers accountable for ethical conduct.  
Considerate and fair treatment of followers often corresponds with ethical leadership, but 
not completely (Treviño et al., 2003). 
Victor and Cullen (1988) suggested that ethical workplace climates tend to vary 
along two distinct dimensions: ethical criteria, the reasoning process by which ethical 
decisions are made; and the focus of the ethical reasoning, which identifies the scope of 
ethical issues under consideration.  Sims (2000) and Sims and Brinkman (2002) describe 
how leaders shape and reinforce the ethical climate of an organization through ethical 
leadership.  While the literature articulates different processes by which a leader’s ethical 
approach affects an organization’s ethical climate, leaders have substantial power (a) to 
create and maintain ethical norms and processes, and (b) to create a particular kind of 
ethical climate.  Victor and Cullen (1988) referred to the organization’s ethical climate as 
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the plant level.  At the plant level, the relationship among (a) climate and incidences of 
injuries and (b) climate and safety motivation can be discerned more clearly.  This 
relationship represents a condition that is within the organizations’ ability to change. 
Transforming leaders inspire followers by aligning their own and their followers’ 
value systems toward important moral principles (Burns, 1978).  Bass and Avolio (1993) 
describe transformational leaders as role models (i.e., as examples to be followed) and as 
demonstrative of “high moral and ethical conduct” (Avolio, 1999, p. 43).  Brown et al. 
(2005) describe how both ethical and transformational leaders care about others, act 
consistently with integrity, consider the ethical consequences of their decisions, and serve 
as ethical role models.  Avolio et al. (2004) examined the effects of transformational 
leadership on followers’ organizational commitment.  Notably, the fact that the structural 
distance between the leader and follower, or the extent in which leadership was direct or 
indirect, mediated the relationship between transformational leaders and his/her 
leadership style on followers’ organizational commitment makes investigation of ethical 
leadership at the plant level particularly salient.  Walumbwa et al. (2004) further 
investigated the underlying processes by which transformational leadership influences 
followers.  Their findings suggest that transformational leadership plays a positive role in 
increasing collective efficacy among followers, which in turn has a positive impact on job 
satisfaction and commitment.  The leadership construct used in this study reflects the 
manner in which leaders applied ethical leadership in the workplace, that is, 
transformational leadership.  Barling et al. (2002) described each of the four components 
of transformational leadership as relevant to improving workplace safety. 
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Researchers have examined the predictors of safety climate and suggest that 
positive safety climates are created when leaders demonstrate a commitment to safe 
practices and policies within an organization (DeJoy, 1985; Zohar, 1980).  Perceptions of 
safety climate are “shared perceptions of managerial policies, procedures and practices,” 
(Zohar, 2002a, p. 75) relating to safety.  Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) note that these 
shared perceptions influence the employees’ actions and safety behavior in the 
workplace.  Barling et al. (2002) found that perceptions of safety climate mediated the 
relationship among transformational leadership style and safety related events, which in 
turn predicted occupational injuries.  Zohar (2000) provided evidence for the group level 
model of safety climate and the prediction of injuries as opposed to organizational 
policies and procedures concerning safety.  Using a sample of 208 hospital workers, Neal 
and Griffin (2006) examined the impact of perceptions of safety climate and safety 
motivation on employee safety behavior and accidents.  The study’s results showed that 
perceptions of safety climate were relatively stable over a two-year period, suggesting 
that consistency may also be expected in various safety outcomes in organizations.   
Neal and Griffin (1997) proposed a model of safety performance that 
distinguishes between two dimensions of safety behavior: safety compliance and safety 
participation.  Safety compliance involves carrying out required behaviors that maintain 
workplace safety, such as following safety procedures and wearing protective safety 
equipment.  Safety participation involves behaviors that indirectly contribute to 
developing a safe work environment, such as employee initiative to voluntarily 
participate in safety activities and programs (Cree & Kelloway, 1997).  Although 
important safety policies and training programs are legislated in the United States, the 
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legislation does not ensure that employees will comply with the policies or wear the 
appropriate safety equipment (Mullen, 2004).  Accordingly, an individual’s willingness 
to voluntarily participate in an organization’s safety procedures becomes central to 
improving workplace safety. 
Leaders who act consistently in a safety-specific transformational manner do so 
by communicating high expectations regarding safety, show an interest in the safety of 
employees, and encourage employees to develop innovative ways to improve current 
safety practices that contribute to the enhancement of perceived safety climate and 
increased safety performance (Barling et al., 2002).  High quality leader-member 
relationships are associated with fewer safety related accidents in the workplace 
(Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999).  Barling et al.’s (2002) findings also support the claim 
that individuals reciprocate high quality relationships with their leader by adopting 
greater safety participation.  Studies on the effect of individual risk perceptions on 
participation in health and safety programs illustrate that perceived risk directly predicts 
participation (Cree & Kelloway, 1997; Goldberg et al., 1991).  Individuals who 
experience close calls or safety related events display higher levels of safety participation 
(Mullen, 2004).  Cree and Kelloway (1997) suggested that exposure to workplace 
accidents, or safety related events, strongly influences an individual’s risk appraisal; 
therefore, such that risk appraisal increases as exposure to the events increases. 
The purpose of this study was to develop and evaluate a model linking ethical 
leadership and an ethical workplace climate with measurable safety outcomes expressed 
as occupational injuries.  The model was based on the assumption that ethical leadership 
and ethical workplace climate are distinct constructs.  The study was based upon the 
38 
 
38 
following hypothesized model parameters.  Ethical leadership is related to an ethical 
workplace climate.  Perceptions of ethical leadership predict safety climate, safety 
participation, and safety compliance.  Furthermore, employee perceptions of their 
workplace’s ethical climate predict safety climate, which in turn predict perceptions of 
both safety participation and safety compliance.  Perceptions of safety climate predict 
safety participation and safety related events.  Perceptions of safety compliance also 
predict safety participation and safety related events.  Finally, perceptions of safety 
related events predict safety participation and occupational injuries.  Given the 
importance of ethical leadership for its ability to influence workplace outcomes, the 
ability of organizations to influence ethical workplace climates, and the ability of safety 
culture to influence safety outcomes this study sought to link these ethical constructs with 
safety related events and occupational injuries to determine if employee perceptions of 
these ethical constructs were related to safety outcomes. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
A review of the relevant literature supported the use of structural equation 
modeling – path analysis (SEM-PA) to determine to what extent a relationship exists 
between the effects of ethical leadership and an ethical workplace climate on measurable 
safety outcomes.  This approach was informed by Mullen’s (2005) work on determining a 
relationship among transformational leadership, passive leadership, and occupational 
injuries.  The purpose of this study was to establish the relationship among ethical 
leadership, an ethical workplace climate, and occupational injuries.  The study 
(a) attempted to discover the relationship among the variables ethical leadership, ethical 
workplace climate, safety climate, safety participation, safety compliance, safety related 
events, and occupational injuries, then (b) used that information to create an empirical 
model among the variables, (c) evaluated the model on a sample of aviation and 
healthcare workers, and (d) examined the results using structural equation modeling. 
Research Approach 
The method used was a structural equation model for the testing and evaluating of 
relations using a combination of statistical analysis and qualitative structural 
assumptions.  The assumptions were based upon previous studies in the literature, and the 
operationalization of the factors investigated was accomplished with a hybrid instrument 
developed from previous studies.  Necessarily, the development of a structural equation 
model is iterative and involved redefinition of the model as the statistical analysis 
informed the quality of the structural assumptions. 
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Design and procedures.  Participants received an Internet link to an informed 
consent form explaining the voluntary nature of the study (see Appendix B) and a survey 
(see Appendix C).  The survey contained items that assessed the participants’ perception 
of their direct manager’s ethical leadership, perceptions of the workplace’s ethical 
climate, perceptions of safety climate, perceptions of their safety participation, 
perceptions of safety compliance, safety related events, injuries, and demographic items. 
Population and Sample 
The study drew samples from two populations of workers in safety-sensitive 
positions of U.S. airlines and inpatient healthcare providers where there is a potential for 
exposure to common occupational injuries.  Helmreich and Merritt (1998) were among 
the first to draw comparisons between the high reliability organizations (HROs) of 
aviation and healthcare.  Helmreich (2000) noted “in both domains, risk varies from low 
to high with threats coming from a variety of sources in the environment” (p. 720).  
Helmreich’s work is grounded in human factors psychology; the Threat and Error 
Management (TEM) model is the basis of his work in crew resource management 
(CRM), organizations, and measures of safety (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999; 
Helmreich, 2002).  Based on previous research by Perrow (1982), and Weick and Roberts 
(1993), HROs can be defined as organizations that have fewer than normal accidents.  
This decrease in accidents occurs through change in culture (Weick & Roberts, 1993).  In 
order to strengthen the generalizability of the findings, these two distinct and separate 
employee groups were examined (Brady, 1986). 
Westland (2010) developed a statistical algorithm to compute a lower bound on 
the sample size in SEM assuming that observations were normally distributed.  The 
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algorithm was applied in a meta-study comprising 74 research studies using SEM.  
Westland concluded that 53% of studies in this sample used sample sizes that fell below 
the algorithm’s computed lower bound for their models.  The lower bounds computed are 
less than or equal to the absolute minimum sample sizes.  Significance was set to a 
default of 0.05, as suggested by Fisher (1925), and power was set to 0.8, as suggested by 
Cohen (1988).  Application of the algorithm to the hypothesized model for this study 
yielded a requirement for the hypothesized model of a minimum sample size of 87 to 
detect effect and a minimum sample size of 400 to detect the model’s structure.  The 
minimum sample size of 400 respondents (Westland, 2010) was obtained in order to 
ensure detection of both effect and model structure.  As over 400 responses from both 
aviation and healthcare populations were received, independent models were assessed for 
each population in addition to the modeling of all responses from both HROs together. 
Sources of the Data 
Data used in this study were obtained by online questionnaire.  The composite 
instrument, including demographic measurements, is presented in Appendix C.  The 
individual items, sorted by the factor they assess, are presented in Appendix D. 
Respondents were contacted by email from their respective company’s human 
resource department, or equivalent, and invited to participate in the study via online 
questionnaire.  Because of confidentiality requirements, both corporate and legal, it was 
not possible to directly contact participants except through the proxies of their respective 
human resource departments.  Given contemporary response rates to electronic surveys, 
described further in Chapter IV, and the requirements for adequate sample size described 
above, considerable oversampling of the population was required.  To that end, corporate 
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dissemination of the invitation to all eligible members of the population was the only 
option to meet the requirements for analysis.   
Data Collection Device 
The 99 parameters representing the seven constructs investigated in the study 
were taken from existing instruments that were used in their entirety, albeit in a 
randomized order.  No modifications to the instrument items occurred in creating the 
composite instrument in Appendix C.  Each of the constructs and their original, 
independent, instrument are described below. 
Ethical leadership.  Ethical leadership was assessed using Craig and Gustafson’s 
(1998) 31-item scale of perceived leader integrity.  Examples of the items include “My 
supervisor can be trusted,” and “My supervisor lacks high morals.”  Respondents 
indicated their agreement with the statements on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Ethical workplace climate.  Ethical workplace climate was assessed with Cullen, 
Victor, and Bronson’s (1993) 26-item ethical climate scale.  Examples of the items 
include “In my workplace, people are only concerned for themselves,” and “In my 
workplace, people comply with the law.”  Respondents indicated their agreement with the 
statements on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Safety climate.  Safety climate was assessed with a 10-item short form of Zohar’s 
(1980) safety climate scale.  Examples of the items include “My boss is willing to invest 
money and effort to improve safety in this job,” and “Workers who work safely have a 
better chance of promotion here.”  Respondents indicated their agreement with the 
statements on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
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Safety participation.  Safety participation was assessed using Neal et al.’s (2000) 
four-item safety participation scale.  Examples of the items include “I promote safety 
within the organization,” and “I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the 
workplace.”  Respondents indicated their agreement with the statements on a seven-point 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Safety compliance.  Safety compliance was assessed by Neal et al.’s (2000) four-
item safety compliance scale.  Examples of items include “I use all the necessary safety 
equipment to do my job,” and “I use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my 
job.”  Respondents indicated their agreement with the statements on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Safety related events.  Safety related events were assessed using a 16-item scale 
developed by Barling et al. (2002).  Items include, “While performing my job I... ‘had 
something fall on me,’ and ‘overextended myself lifting or moving things.’”  
Respondents indicated the frequency in which the events occurred on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (rarely) to 7 (frequently). 
Occupational injuries.  Injuries were assessed with eight items developed by 
Barling et al. (2002).  The measure was based on Castillo’s (1999) description of the 
types of injuries that young workers experience.  Examples of injuries included strains or 
sprains, cuts or lacerations, and bruises or contusions.  Respondents indicated the 
frequency in which the events occurred on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (rarely) to 
7 (frequently). 
Instrument reliability.  The instruments’ reliability was assessed with 
Cronbach’s (1951) alpha for the items of each factor relative to previous administrations 
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of the individual instruments in prior studies.  In the studies cited in Chapter II, 
Cronbach’s alpha exceeded .7 in all instances, indicating that the reliability was at least at 
an acceptable level of internal consistency.  In the case of this study, the desired internal 
consistency should approximate previous reliability values for the individual instruments.  
To this end, only preexisting items were used in the composite instrument.   
Instrument validity.  The instrument was a composite of seven existing 
instruments.  Each instrument has extensive histories in the literature, and each 
instrument is well established for both criterion and content validity.  Issues of construct 
validity were mitigated by purposeful design, namely the inclusion of all items from each 
of the constituent instruments.  The use of factor analysis prior to hypothesis testing to 
ensure dimensionality further assessed the construct validity.   
Treatment of the Data 
Descriptive statistics.  Descriptive statistics, inter-correlations, and scale 
reliabilities for all variables are presented.  Given the nature of the sample, some items 
may exhibit demographic skewing related to the workplace.  Age data was collected for 
both workplace groups and will be retained for use in future studies. 
Missing data were expected to be minimal for most variables.  Given missing 
data, Byrne (2010) recommends that parameter estimates and model tests be pursued in 
the context of Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods as implemented in 
IBM® SPSS® Amos SEM software package.  Missing data bias has been eliminated by 
removal of any case with incomplete responses, as described in Chapter IV. 
Reliability testing.  The instrument’s reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s 
(1951) alpha for the items of each factor relative to previous administrations of the 
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individual instruments in prior studies.  While a set of items may score below .7 on 
Cronbach’s alpha, some of the fit indices, described below, for the model will remain 
above the cutoff levels, generally .9.  In this scenario, the alpha may be lower because of 
a lack of homogeneity of variances among items.  Alpha may also be reported at a lower 
value if there are fewer items comprising the scales or factors being assessed for 
reliability (Garson, 2012). 
Hypothesis testing.  A between-groups ANOVA was conducted to assess 
differences attributed to workplace condition.  With the use of Wilks’ (1932) criterion, it 
is possible to determine if the combined factors are significantly affected by a 
demographic factor.  Although there are no hypotheses that involve the respondent’s age, 
that data will be retained to guide future investigations. 
Factor analyses were performed prior to hypothesis testing to ensure that all of the 
independent variables (IVs) of the model are retained as discrete factors.  In accordance 
with Kaiser (1960), as adapted by Joliffe (1972, 1986), factors with eigenvalues greater 
than .7 were retained as discrete IVs.  Given that Kaiser’s criterion is held to be accurate 
when the number of variables are less than 30 and/or when the sample size is greater  
than 250, this criterion is appropriate for the sample to be used in this study (Nunnaly & 
Bernstien, 1984).  These factors were verified with scree plots, as the sample size was in 
excess of 200 (Stevens, 2002).   
The 14 hypotheses listed in Chapter II were evaluated using the IBM® SPSS® 
Amos SEM software package (Amos) to describe the directed dependencies among the 
seven factors of the model.  SEM-PA is a special case of SEM that presents a structural 
model but no measurement model.  The analyses were estimated with maximum 
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likelihood estimation using Amos version 18 (Byrne, 2010).  The fit of the models were 
assessed through the examination of the fit indices provided by Amos using model chi-
square (CMIN), normed fit index (NFI), comparative fit index (CFI), parsimony normed 
fit index (PNFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).  This selection 
was based on a review of the literature and on the fact that these indices are the least 
sensitive to sample size, model misspecification, and parameter estimates. 
A model with good fit is not synonymous with strength of relationship: a model 
wherein all variables were uncorrelated could exhibit perfect fit if the researcher failed to 
instruct the software to constrain the variances (Byrne, 2010).  Moreover, the lower the 
correlations are that are stipulated in the model, the easier it becomes for the software to 
identify a good fit.  Stronger correlations must be stipulated in order to determine an 
incorrect model.  Having low correlations may result in a lack of statistical power for the 
researcher to reject the model.  Should the variables have low correlation, the path 
coefficients will also be low (Byrne, 2010). 
A mis-specified model can still demonstrate good fit.  An indicator of such a 
model is when there are high modification indexes (MI) in spite of a good fit.  Such high 
MIs indicate that multicollinearity exists in the model, in the correlated error, or in both.  
A mathematically equivalent model can exist for almost all models – as the complexity of 
the model increases, so too does the potential for an equivalent model – necessitating 
systematic evaluation of all models.  Kline (1998) encourages all SEM-based articles to 
include demonstration of the superior fit of preferred models over selected, yet plausible 
equivalent models.  Spirtes, Richardson, Meek, Scheines, and Glymour (1998) noted, 
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“[i]t is important to present all of the simplest alternatives compatible with the 
background knowledge and data rather than to arbitrarily choose one” (p. 203).   
Model revision.  The model required modification in order to improve the fit of 
the data, thereby estimating the most likely relationships between variables.  These 
modifications were conducted in accordance with the indications of fit previously 
mentioned.  Maruyama (1998) and Tanaka (1993) identify four types of fit indices:  
absolute fit indices, relative fit indices, parsimony fit indices, and those fit indices based 
on the noncentrality parameter.   
The indices of absolute fit compare with an alternative model.  They are derived 
from the fit of the obtained and implied covariance matrices and the maximum likelihood 
estimation (ML) minimization function.  Byrne (2010) states the chi-square (χ2, or 
CMIN) is the original fit index for structural models because it is derived directly from 
the fit function, fML(N - 1).  The closer the value of CMIN is to zero, the better the model 
fit.  However, sample sizes greater than 200 are likely to produce a Type I error, 
necessitating a holistic approach to assessing model fit using multiple indices (Byrne, 
2010). 
The relative fit indices compare the chi-square for the model to a null model.  The 
null model is a model tested that specifies that all measured variables are uncorrelated, or 
that there are no latent variables.  The NFI is then computed using ratios of the model 
chi-square, the null model chi-square, and degrees of freedom for both models 
(Maruyama, 1998).  Generally, a good fitting model is considered to have a NFI > .90 
(Byrne, 2010).  
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Parsimonious fit indices are relative fit indices that are adjustments to their 
conventional complement.  PNFI, based on NFI, imposes a penalty upon models that are 
less parsimonious; simpler theoretical processes are favored over more complex 
theoretical processes.  The parsimonious fit indices are used in conjunction with the 
relative fit index to determine their appropriateness for use.  A model would not be 
penalized for more parameters; however if a simpler alternative model fits as well it 
should be considered (Byrne, 2010).  As with its complement, a PNFI > .90 would be 
considered to be a good fit. 
The noncentrality-based index used is CFI.  This index analyzes the model fit by 
examining the discrepancy between the data and the hypothesized model while adjusting 
for the issues of sample size inherent in the chi-squared test of model fit and the NFI.  A 
CFI value of .90 or larger will be considered to indicate acceptable model fit (Byrne, 
2010). 
The RMSEA avoids issues of sample size by analyzing the discrepancy between 
the hypothesized model with optimally chosen parameter estimates and the population 
covariance matrix.  The RMSEA ranges from 0 to 1; smaller values indicating better 
model fit.  A value of .10 or less is indicative of acceptable model fit (Byrne, 2010). 
Internal validity of the model was assessed with the covariance matrix of the 
seven factors serving as the input to the maximum likelihood estimation procedure as part 
of the analysis (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993).  This internal validity was then reassessed 
with each modification of the model.  The best fit of the data necessitated multiple 
revisions to the structure of the model with respect to moderation and mediation of the 
factors.  According to the literature, equivalent models can account for the data relative to 
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the models being tested.  Equivalent models are described and are used to qualify 
conclusions in the Chapter V. 
Variable and factor specification.  The convention used for variable naming was 
based upon the initials or partial names of the construct measured by each scale and the 
appropriate item number.  This convention is shown in Table 1 while each item is 
presented in Appendix D.  The factors were similarly named using the initials or partial 
names of the construct measured.  Where factor analysis resulted in multiple factors for 
each construct, as described in Chapter IV, those factors were noted with the appropriate 
subscript identifier.  The factors and sub-factor specification schema that evolved from 
the initial seven constructs via factor analysis is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variables and Factors. 
    Description 
Variable EL(n) Ethical leadership scale item n 
 
EWC(n) Ethical workplace climate scale item n 
 
SCli(n) Safety climate scale item n 
 
SPar(n) Safety participation scale item n 
 
SCom(n) Safety compliance scale item n 
 
SRE(n) Safety related events scale item n 
 
OI(n) Occupational injuries scale item n 
Factor EL Ethical leadership factor 
 
EWCFn Ethical workplace climate factor n (name) 
 
SCliFn Safety climate factor n (name) 
 
SPar Safety participation factor 
 
SCom Safety compliance factor 
 
SRE Safety related events factor 
 
OI Occupational injuries factor 
Note.  All items are listed in Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This study explored the relationship between ethical leadership and an ethical 
workplace climate with measurable safety outcomes expressed as occupational injuries.  
A model was formulated based on the assumption that ethical leadership and ethical 
workplace climate are distinct constructs.  The mediating and moderating roles of safety 
climate, safety participation, and safety compliance upon safety outcomes were explored 
in the structure of the model. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The instrument was electronically distributed to 6,263 individuals who met the 
criteria for inclusion and constituted the population of the study.  Of these, 2,613 were 
employed in the aviation domain and 3,650 were employed in the healthcare domain.  
The response counts and rates are shown in Table 2.  All incomplete responses were 
deleted casewise and removed prior to any analysis.  The response rate is discussed 
further in Chapter V. 
 
Table 2. Response Rate. 
Population Distributed Incomplete Valid 
Response 
Rate 
Aviation 2,613 58 413 15.81% 
Health Care 3,650 104 424 11.62% 
Total 6,263 162 837 13.36% 
 
 
The age of all valid respondents (n = 837), which will be retained for future 
investigation, was reported as mean = 47.3, median = 49, mode = 54, σ = 11.641.  The 
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descriptive statistics for the individual response items are presented in Appendix E, Table 
E1.   
Reliability Testing 
Reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s (1951) alpha for each of the constituent 
scales.  These values are presented in Table 3.  Reliability analysis of all responses  
(n = 837) across all seven scales computed simultaneously resulted in a value for alpha  
of .841 for an N of items = 99. 
 
Table 3. Reliability Testing. 
Scale 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
N of  
items 
Ethical leadership .869 31 
Ethical workplace climate .773 26 
Safety climate .772 10 
Safety participation .789 4 
Safety compliance .832 4 
Safety related events .855 16 
Occupational injuries .819 8 
 
 
Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis using principal component analysis with Varimax rotation was 
employed on the full dataset of aviation and healthcare employment conditions for two 
purposes.  First, two analyses were performed to ensure that the ethical leadership and 
ethical workplace climate constructs were separate and distinct, while also ensuring that 
safety climate, safety participation, and safety compliance were separate and distinct 
constructs.  Secondly, each scale was factored independently to ensure that it represented 
the construct claimed, or to determine what sub-constructs may exist.   
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After rotation, factor analysis demonstrated that the constructs of ethical 
leadership and ethical workplace climate loaded independently.  Loadings of less than .40 
were omitted for clarity.  The eigenvalues were visually verified and confirmed by scree 
plot.  The first factor, ethical leadership, accounted for 41.3% of the variance.  However, 
as seen in Table E2 in Appendix E, ethical workplace climate loaded into four discrete 
factors.  The first factor, EWCF1, related to laws and codified regulations that apply to the 
workplace, accounted for 12.2% of the variance.  The second factor, EWCF2, related to 
idealized concepts of ethical good beyond the self, accounted for 7.6% of the variance.  
The third factor, EWCF3, related to ethical issues of self-interest, accounted for 7.1% of 
the variance.  The fourth factor, EWCF4, related an individual’s sense of morality, 
accounted for 5.1% of the variance.  The first three factors of ethical workplace climate 
were retained as discrete items for the remaining analyses.  The fourth ethical workplace 
climate subscale, EWCF4, did not yield any statistically significant paths among any of 
the mediator constructs, safety related events, or occupational injuries during modeling of 
the dataset.  As a result, the EWCF4 factor was removed from model construction and 
presentation for the sake of clarity in the iterative models that followed. 
Factor analysis of the mediating and moderating constructs revealed that each 
construct was discrete from the others.  Table E3 in Appendix E shows the rotated 
component matrix for the safety climate, safety participation, and safety compliance 
scales.  Loadings of less than .40 were omitted for clarity.  The eigenvalues were visually 
verified and confirmed by scree plot.  After rotation, the first factor, safety compliance, 
accounted for 19.7% of the variance.  The third factor, safety participation, accounted for 
18.2% of the variance.  The loading of the safety climate items revealed two independent 
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factors.  The first factor, SCliF1, related to proactive safety climate issues, accounted  
for 18.5% of the variance.  The second factor, SCliF2, related to outcome-based safety 
climate issues, accounted for 16.8% of the variance.  These four factors, SCom, SPar, 
SCliF1, and SCliF2, were retained as discrete items for the remaining analyses. 
Analysis of Variance 
A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted on the full dataset to 
compare the effects of employment condition, aviation or healthcare, on the ten emergent 
factors of the previous analysis.  The generalized null hypothesis was that there was no 
significant difference in the means of the variable between the respondents in the 
healthcare field compared to the respondents in the aviation field.  There was no 
significant effect of employment condition on ethical leadership at the p < .05 level for 
the two conditions, F(1, 835) = 1.986, p = .159.  Therefore, the null hypothesis for the 
effect of employment condition on ethical leadership failed to be rejected.  There was a 
significant effect of employment condition on ethical workplace climate for the EWCF1 
factor, regulations, at the p < .05 level for the two conditions, F(1, 835) = 17.375,  
p < .000, η2 =.021, indicating a large effect.  Healthcare had a significantly higher mean  
(M = 5.47) than aviation (M = 5.05).  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.  There 
were no significant effects of employment condition on ethical workplace climate for the 
EWCF2, idealized ethos, or EWCF3, self-interest, factors at the p < .05 level for the two 
conditions, F(1, 835) = 1.855, p = .173, and F(1, 835) = .260, p = .610, respectively.  
Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected. 
Similarly, there were no significant effects of employment condition on safety 
climate for the SCliF1, proactive, or SCliF2, outcomes, factors at the p < .05 level for the 
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two conditions, F(1, 835) = .472, p = .492, and F(1, 835) = .314, p = .575, respectively.  
Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  Both safety participation and safety 
compliance demonstrated significant effects of employment condition on them at the  
p < .05 level for the two conditions, with F(1, 835) = 6.859, p = .009, η2 = .008 for safety 
participation, and F(1, 835) = 20.712,  p < .000, η2 =  .024 for safety compliance.  Both of 
these relationships demonstrated a medium effect.  Therefore, the null hypotheses were 
rejected.  Finally, there were no significant effects of employment condition on safety 
related events or occupational injuries at the p < .05 level for the two conditions, with  
F(1, 835) = 1.060, p = .304 for safety related events, and F(1, 835) = .631, p = .427, for 
occupational injuries.  Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  The ANOVA 
tables by item are shown in Appendix E, Table E4.  Descriptive statistics for the factors 
are shown in Appendix E, Table E5.  Levene’s statistics for the ANOVA by factors are 
shown in Appendix E, Table E6 and the ANOVA tables by factors are shown in 
Appendix E, Table E7. 
Model Revision 
The use of factor analysis expanded the number of constructs for the SEM-PA 
from the initial seven to ten to account for the additional two factors for ethical 
workplace climate and one additional factor for safety climate.  To assess the proposed 
models, the covariance matrix of the variables served as the input to the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedures of IBM SPSS Amos version 20.  The initial, fully 
mediated model is shown in Figure 3.  This model failed to produce an adequate fit, as 
evidenced by the fit indices: NFI = .752; CFI = .757; RMSEA = .155; CMIN = 379.500; 
df = 18. 
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Review of the modification indices suggested three additive modifications to the 
model.  A covariant path was added between the two safety climate factors, a path was 
added from ethical leadership to occupational injuries without mediation, and a path was 
suggested between occupational injuries and the second factor of safety climate, 
outcomes.  This last modification was removed as it was found to generate non-
significant values for the path coefficient.   
 
 
Figure 3. Model One - Fully mediated model. 
 
Multiple subtractive modifications were suggested by the model’s fit indices.  
These included the removal of paths (a) between ethical leadership and the first factor of 
safety climate, (b) between ethical leadership and safety compliance, (c) between the first 
factor of ethical workplace climate and the second factor of safety climate, (d) between 
the first factor of ethical workplace climate and safety compliance, (e) between the 
second factor of ethical workplace climate and safety compliance, (f) between the third 
56 
 
56 
factor of ethical workplace climate and the first factor of safety climate, (g) between the 
third factor of ethical workplace climate and safety participation, (h) between the first 
factor of safety climate and safety participation, and (i) between safety compliance and 
safety participation.  The sum of these modification yielded the greatest incremental 
improvement to model fit, NFI = .929; CFI = .936; RMSEA = .090; CMIN = 109.370;  
df = 14.  The resultant model is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Model Two - Partially mediated ethical leadership model. 
 
The next iteration of model revision was again guided by review of the 
modification indices and resulted in the addition of two new paths to the model.  The first 
of these paths links the third factor of ethical workplace climate with safety related events 
while the second links the second factor of ethical workplace climate occupational 
injuries.  The first modification was removed as it also was found to generate non-
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significant values for the path coefficient.  The path between the second factor of ethical 
workplace climate and the second factor of safety climate was also removed to improve 
model fit, NFI = .950; CFI = .957; RMSEA = .080; CMIN = 76.434; df = 12.  This 
partially mediated model is shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Model Three - Partially mediated ethical leadership and workplace climate 
model. 
 
 
Adding a single path between ethical leadership and safety related events without 
mediation created the fourth and final model revision.  No other changes to model 
structure were made and optimal fit was obtained, NFI = .954; CFI = .960;  
RMSEA = .073; CMIN = 70.058; df = 11.  This minimally mediated model is shown in 
Figure 6 and represents the end-state model for the analysis.  Figure 7 shows this model 
with standardized regression weights for the paths using the combined dataset of aviation 
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and healthcare workplace conditions.  The fit indices for all four models, as well as the 
final model isolated for workplace condition is presented in Table 4.  The standardized 
regression weights for the best-fit model are shown in Table 5.  The standardized 
regression weights for the best-fit models by hypothesis for the aviation, health care, and 
combined workplaces are presented in Appendix E, Tables E8 through E10, respectively.  
The standardized regression weights for the non-hypothesized paths in the best-fit models 
for all three workplaces are shown in Appendix E, Table E11. 
 
 
Figure 6. Model Four - Minimally mediated ethical leadership and workplace climate 
model. This path model provides the best fit for the data among the factors. 
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Figure 7. Model Four with standardized regression weights. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Fit Indices for the Alternative Models. 
Model CMIN df p NFI CFI PNFI RMSEA LO HI 
1 379.500 18 .000 .752 .757 .301 .155 .142 .169 
2 109.370 14 .000 .929 .936 .289 .090 .075 .106 
3 76.434 12 .000 .950 .957 .253 .080 .064 .098 
4 70.058 11 .000 .954 .960 .233 .080 .063 .099 
4a 35.065 11 .088 .956 .968 .234 .073 .047 .101 
4b 61.560 11 .000 .928 .938 .227 .104 .080 .130 
Note.  aAviation only.  bHealth care only. 
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Table 5. Standardized Regression Weights for the Combined Best-Fit Model. 
Factor Path Factor Hypothesis Estimate S.E. C.R. p 
EL ! SCliF2 2b .226 .044 5.139 *** 
  
SPar 3 -.149 .039 -3.792 *** 
  
SRE n/a .095 .039 2.428 .015 
  
OI n/a .372 .029 13.029 *** 
EWCF1 ! SCliF1 5a .413 .032 13.068 *** 
  
SPar 6a .278 .040 7.016 *** 
EWCF2 ! SCliF1 5b .369 .030 12.510 *** 
  
OI n/a .128 .028 4.553 *** 
EWCF3 ! SCliF2 5f .362 .035 10.216 *** 
  
SCom 7c .118 .031 3.764 *** 
  
SRE n/a .164 .040 4.132 *** 
SCliF1 ! SCliF2 n/a .586 .132 -2.455 *** 
  
SRE 9a -.080 .037 -2.167 .030 
SCliF2 ! SCliF1 n/a .586 .130 4.587 *** 
  
SPar 8b .116 .044 2.635 .008 
  
SRE 9b .097 .047 2.052 .040 
SRE ! SPar 12 .078 .035 2.227 .026 
  
OI 13 .371 .030 12.380 *** 
Note.  *** p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
The use of SEM-PA allowed evaluation of the relationships between ethical 
leadership and ethical workplace climate upon safety related events and occupational 
injuries.  This study examined the mediating roles that safety climate, safety 
participation, and safety compliance had on the relationships of ethical leadership and 
ethical workplace climate upon safety related events and occupational injuries.  The 
SEM-PA method allowed each relationship to be evaluated independently as well as to 
provide an overall measure of model fit.  The results of the hypothesis testing are 
described below and summarized in Tables 6, 7, and 8 for the aviation, healthcare, and 
combined employment conditions respectively. 
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Hypothesis 1.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and an ethical workplace climate for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model does not support the path that connects ethical leadership to 
ethical workplace climate for the populations of aviation, healthcare, or the combined 
populations.  Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  Ethical leadership has 
no significant relationship with any of the three factors within ethical workplace climate 
for aviation, healthcare, or combined results. 
Hypothesis 1a.  The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of 
ethical workplace climate, regulation, for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of .034 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .050; C.R. = .686; p = .492); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of ethical 
workplace climate, regulation, for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value  
of -.025 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .047; C.R. = -.505; p = .614); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of ethical 
workplace climate, regulation, for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value 
of .000 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .035; C.R. = .000; p = 1.000); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 1b.  The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor 
of ethical workplace climate, idealized ethos, for aviation workplaces generated a 
coefficient value of -.027 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .048; C.R. = -.551;  
p = .582); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected.  
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The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor of ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of .034 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .050; C.R. = .698; p = .485); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor of ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient 
value of .000 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .035; C.R. = .000; p = 1.000); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 1c.  The relationship between ethical leadership and the third factor of 
ethical workplace climate, self-interest, for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of -.062 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .048; C.R. = -1.268; p = .205); 
therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the third factor of ethical 
workplace climate, self-interest, for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value 
of .065 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .050; C.R. = 1.339; p = .180); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the third factor of ethical 
workplace climate, self-interest, for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient 
value of .000 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .035; C.R. = .000; p = 1.000); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and a safety climate for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  The model supports one path that connects ethical leadership to a safety climate 
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for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined populations.  Ethical 
leadership has no significant relationship with the first of the two factors within safety 
climate, proactive, for aviation, healthcare, or combined results.  Ethical leadership does 
have a significant relationship with the second of the two factors within safety climate, 
outcomes, for aviation, healthcare, and combined results. 
Hypothesis 2a.  The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of 
safety climate, proactive, for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.315 
and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .067; C.R. = -4.441; p = .301); therefore, the null 
hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of safety climate, 
proactive, for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.592 and is not 
significant at 0.05 (SE = .132; C.R. = -4.492; p = .053); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the first factor of safety climate, 
proactive, for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.394 and is not 
significant at 0.05 (SE = .061; C.R. = -6.444; p = .106); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2b.  The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor 
of safety climate, outcomes, for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of .284 
and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .049; C.R. = 5.531; p < .001); therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor of safety 
climate, outcomes, for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of .116 and is 
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significant at 0.05 (SE = .101; C.R. = 1.190; p = .023); therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and the second factor of safety 
climate, outcomes, for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of .226 and 
is significant at 0.05 (SE = .044; C.R. = 5.139; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected. 
Hypothesis 3.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  The model supports the path that connects ethical leadership to safety 
participation for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined populations.  
Therefore, the null hypotheses were rejected.  Ethical leadership has a significant 
relationship with safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined results. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety climate for aviation 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.223 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .053; 
C.R. = -3.999; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety climate for healthcare 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.063 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .056; 
C.R. = -1.178; p = .024); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety climate for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of -.149 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .039; 
C.R. = -3.792; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 4.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and safety communication for aviation, healthcare, and 
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combined results.  The model does not support the path that connects ethical leadership to 
safety communication for the populations of aviation, healthcare, or the combined 
populations.  Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  Ethical leadership has 
no significant relationship with safety communication for aviation, healthcare, or 
combined results. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety communication for 
aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.059 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .049; C.R. = -1.311; p = .190); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety communication for 
healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.116 and is not significant at 0.05  
(SE = .039; C.R. = -2.968; p = .301); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between ethical leadership and safety communication for all 
workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.095 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .031; C.R. = -3.038; p = .203); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 5.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between an ethical workplace climate and a safety climate for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model supports three paths that connect ethical workplace climate 
to safety climate for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined 
populations.  The first factor within ethical workplace climate, regulations, has a 
significant relationship with the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for aviation, 
healthcare, and combined results.  The first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, does not have a significant relationship with the second factor within safety 
climate, outcomes, for aviation, healthcare, or combined results. 
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The second factor within ethical workplace climate, idealized ethos, has a 
significant relationship with the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for aviation, 
healthcare, or combined results.  The second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, does not have a significant relationship with the second factor within 
safety climate, outcomes, for aviation, healthcare, or combined results. 
The third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-interest, does not have 
significant relationships with the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for aviation, 
healthcare, or combined results.  The third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, does have a significant relationship with the second factor within safety climate, 
outcomes, for aviation, healthcare, and combined results. 
Hypothesis 5a.  The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace 
climate, regulations, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for aviation 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of .434 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .039; 
C.R. = 10.248; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for healthcare workplaces 
generated a coefficient value of .404 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .058; C.R. = 7.764;  
p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of .413 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .032;  
C.R. = 13.068; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
67 
 
67 
Hypothesis 5b.  The relationship between the second factor within ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, 
for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of .382 and is significant at 0.05 
(SE = .039; C.R. = 9.549; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for healthcare 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of .289 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .054; 
C.R. = 6.186; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of .369 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .030;  
C.R. = 12.510; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 5c.  The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace 
climate, self-interest, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for aviation 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.298 and is not significant at 0.05  
(SE = .075; C.R. = -3.991; p = .142); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for healthcare workplaces 
generated a coefficient value of -.552 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .125;  
C.R. = -4.433; p = .071); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and the first factor within safety climate, proactive, for all workplaces combined 
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generated a coefficient value of .388 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .063;  
C.R. = -6.169; p = .251); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 5d.  The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace 
climate, regulations, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for aviation 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.090 and is not significant at 0.05  
(SE = .063; C.R. = -1.436; p = .151); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for healthcare 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of .249 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .135; 
C.R. = 1.894; p = .065); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of .037 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .057;  
C.R. = .648; p = .517); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 5e.  The relationship between the second factor within ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, and the second factor within safety climate, 
outcomes, for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.088 and is not 
significant  
at 0.05 (SE = .060; C.R. = -1.469; p = .149); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be 
rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for healthcare 
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workplaces generated a coefficient value of .293 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .123; 
C.R. = 2.380; p = .064); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of .068 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .054;  
C.R. = 1.251; p = .211); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 5f.  The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace 
climate, self-interest, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for aviation 
workplaces generated a coefficient value of .426 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .043; 
C.R. = 9.600; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for healthcare workplaces 
generated a coefficient value of .287 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .068; C.R. = 4.267;  
p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and the second factor within safety climate, outcomes, for all workplaces 
combined generated a coefficient value of .362 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .035;  
C.R. = 10.216; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 6.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical workplace climate and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model supports one path that connects ethical workplace climate 
to safety participation for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined 
populations.  The first factor within ethical workplace climate, regulations, has a 
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significant relationship with safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  The second and third factors within ethical workplace climate, idealized ethos 
and self-interest, do not have significant relationships with safety participation for 
aviation, healthcare, or combined results. 
Hypothesis 6a.  The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace 
climate, regulations, and safety participation for aviation workplaces generated a 
coefficient value of .266 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .053; C.R. = 4.708; p < .001); 
therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and safety participation for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of .257 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .058; C.R. = 4.832; p < .001); therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and safety participation for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient 
value of .278 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .040; C.R. = 7.016; p < .001); therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 6b.  The relationship between the second factor within ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, and safety participation for aviation workplaces 
generated a coefficient value of .170 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .051;  
C.R. = 3.350; p = .431); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and safety participation for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient 
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value of .068 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .051; C.R. = 1.347; p = .178); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and safety participation for all workplaces combined generated a 
coefficient value of .122 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .037; C.R. = 3.314;  
p = .072); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 6c.  The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace 
climate, self-interest, and safety participation for aviation workplaces generated a 
coefficient value of -.078 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .057; C.R. = -1.371;  
p = .170); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and safety participation for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value 
of -.152 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .054; C.R. = -2.812; p = .054); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and safety participation for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient 
value of -.105 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .040; C.R. = -2.637; p = .080); 
therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 7.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between an ethical workplace climate and safety communication for aviation, healthcare, 
and combined results.  The model supports one path that connects ethical workplace 
climate to safety communication for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the 
combined populations. The first and second factors within ethical workplace climate, 
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regulations and idealized ethos, have no significant relationship with safety 
communication for aviation, healthcare, or combined results.  The third factor within 
ethical workplace climate, self-interest, does have a significant relationship with safety 
communication for aviation, healthcare, and combined results. 
Hypothesis 7a.  The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace 
climate, regulations, and safety communication for aviation workplaces generated a 
coefficient value of .380 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .048; C.R. = 7.930;  
p = .190); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and safety communication for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of .352 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .040; C.R. = 8.716; p = .081); therefore, 
the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor within ethical workplace climate, 
regulations, and safety communication for all workplaces combined generated a 
coefficient value of .388 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .031; C.R. = 12.342;  
p = .087); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 7b.  The relationship between the second factor within ethical 
workplace climate, idealized ethos, and safety communication for aviation workplaces 
generated a coefficient value of .056 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .050;  
C.R. = 1.118; p = .263); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and safety communication for healthcare workplaces generated a 
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coefficient value of .037 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .038; C.R. = .976; p = .329); 
therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor within ethical workplace climate, 
idealized ethos, and safety communication for all workplaces combined generated a 
coefficient value of .051 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .031; C.R. = 1.618;  
p = .106); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 7c.  The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace 
climate, self-interest, and safety communication for aviation workplaces generated a 
coefficient value of .145 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .050; C.R. = 3.198; p = .001); 
therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and safety communication for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient 
value of .093 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .038; C.R. = 2.113; p = .035); therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the third factor within ethical workplace climate, self-
interest, and safety communication for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient 
value of .118 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .031; C.R. = 3.764; p < .001); therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 8.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety climate and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  The model supports one path that connects safety climate to safety participation 
for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined populations.  The first of the 
two factors within safety climate, proactive, has no significant relationship with safety 
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participation for aviation, healthcare, or combined results.   The second of the two factors 
within safety climate, outcomes, does have a significant relationship with safety 
participation for aviation and combined results; the healthcare result was not significant. 
Hypothesis 8a.  The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, 
proactive, and safety participation for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value 
of -.036 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .060; C.R. = -.602; p = .547); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, proactive, and safety 
participation for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.295 and is not 
significant at 0.05 (SE = .054; C.R. = -5.510; p = .140); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, proactive, and safety 
participation for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.173 and is 
not significant at 0.05 (SE = .041; C.R. = -4.214; p = .060); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 8b.  The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, 
outcomes, and safety participation for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value  
of .222 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .061; C.R. = 3.628; p < .001); therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, outcomes, and 
safety participation for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of .020 and is 
not significant at 0.05 (SE = .062; C.R. = .329; p = .742); therefore, the null hypothesis 
failed to be rejected. 
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The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, outcomes, and 
safety participation for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of .116 and 
is significant at 0.05 (SE = .044; C.R. = 2.635; p = .008); therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected. 
Hypothesis 9.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between a safety climate and safety related events for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  The model supports the path that connects safety climate to safety related events 
for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined populations.  Therefore, the 
null hypotheses were rejected.  The two factors within safety climate both have a 
significant relationship with safety related events for healthcare and combined results.  
For aviation only, the first factor of safety climate has a significant relationship with 
safety related events. 
Hypothesis 9a.  The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, 
proactive, and safety related events for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value 
of -.116 and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .049; C.R. = -2.225; p = .026); therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, proactive, and safety 
related events for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.076 and is 
significant at 0.05 (SE = .054; C.R. = -1.456; p = .015); therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
The relationship between the first factor of safety climate, proactive, and safety 
related events for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.080 and is 
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significant at 0.05 (SE = .037; C.R. = -2.167; p = .030); therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
Hypothesis 9b.  The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, 
outcomes, and safety related events for aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value 
of -.044 and is not significant at 0.05 (SE = .063; C.R. = -.642; p = .051); therefore, the 
null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, outcomes, and 
safety related events for healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of .219 and 
is significant at 0.05 (SE = .071; C.R. = 3.341; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected. 
The relationship between the second factor of safety climate, outcomes, and 
safety related events for all workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of .097 
and is significant at 0.05 (SE = .047; C.R. = 2.052; p = .040); therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 10.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety communication and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model does not support the path that connects safety 
communication to safety participation for the populations of aviation, healthcare, or the 
combined populations.  Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  Safety 
communication has no significant relationship with safety participation for aviation, 
healthcare, or combined results. 
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The relationship between safety communication and safety participation for 
aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.048 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .045; C.R. = -1.049; p = .294); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between safety communication and safety participation for 
healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.261 and is not significant at 0.05  
(SE = .060; C.R. = -4.378; p = .412); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between safety communication and safety participation for all 
workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.112 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .037; C.R. = -3.047; p = .210); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 11.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety communication and safety related events for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model does not support the path that connects safety 
communication to safety related events for the populations of aviation, healthcare, or the 
combined populations.  Therefore, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected.  Safety 
communication has no significant relationship with safety related events for aviation, 
healthcare, or combined results. 
The relationship between safety communication and safety related events for 
aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.678 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .040; C.R. = -1.952; p = .051); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between safety communication and safety related events for 
healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of -.064 and is not significant at 0.05  
(SE = .060; C.R. = -1.064; p = .287); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
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The relationship between safety communication and safety related events for all 
workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of -.060 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .034; C.R. = -1.762; p = .078); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 12.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety related events and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model supports one path that connects safety related events to 
safety participation for the populations of healthcare and the combined populations. 
Safety related events have no significant relationship with safety participation for 
aviation results.  Safety related events do have a significant relationship with safety 
participation for healthcare and for combined results. 
The relationship between safety related events and safety participation for 
aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of .058 and is not significant at 0.05 
(SE = .054; C.R. = 1.179; p = .238); therefore, the null hypothesis failed to be rejected. 
The relationship between safety related events and safety participation for 
healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of .122 and is significant at 0.05  
(SE = .045; C.R. = 2.530; p = .011); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between safety related events and safety participation for all 
workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of .078 and is significant at 0.05  
(SE = .035; C.R. = 2.227; p = .026); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 13.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety related events and occupational injuries for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  The model supports the path that connects safety related events to 
occupational injuries for the populations of aviation, healthcare, and the combined 
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populations.  Therefore, the null hypotheses were rejected.  Safety related events have a 
significant relationship with safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results. 
The relationship between safety related events and occupational injuries for 
aviation workplaces generated a coefficient value of .390 and is significant at 0.05  
(SE = .051; C.R. = 8.479; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between safety related events and occupational injuries for 
healthcare workplaces generated a coefficient value of .373 and is significant at 0.05  
(SE = .037; C.R. = 9.416; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The relationship between safety related events and occupational injuries for all 
workplaces combined generated a coefficient value of .371 and is significant at 0.05  
(SE = .030; C.R. = 12.380; p < .001); therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 14.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no difference 
between populations of high reliability organizations with regard to model fit.  A 
comparison of model fit indices, as shown in Table 4, demonstrated that there was no 
difference between the populations of high reliability organizations, presented as the 
workplace conditions of aviation.  As discussed in Chapter III, the evaluation of model fit 
must be made holistically after considering all of the relevant fit indices.  Although both 
the health care-only best-fit model and the combined best-fit model did have significant 
p-values, this result alone was insufficient to reject the model fit.  Byrne (2010) notes that 
CMIN is likely to produce a Type I error when sample sizes are greater than 200, as they 
were in all models in this study.  Accordingly, the significant p-values cannot be relied 
upon to reject fit. 
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Instead, as suggested by Byrne (2010), Kline (1998), and Maruyama (1998), 
CMIN is used only to show incremental improvement to the model as one of several 
indices.  By evaluating an improvement in the values of CMIN, as well as NFI, CFI, 
PNFI, and RMSEA, with each model specification a researcher is then able to see 
improvements or degradations in fit.  The fourth model, shown in Figure 7, represents the 
best fit possible among the constructs of the model.  Examining the fit indices for those 
three employment conditions in Model Four, the CMIN statistic indicated acceptable fit 
with a non-significant p-value and the lowest score of any model.  Yet when NFI, CFI, 
PNFI, or RMSEA are compared the difference became negligible between the 
populations used as inputs to Model Four: aviation alone, health care alone, and the 
combined dataset.   
The hypothesis regarding population differences is based upon model fit.  Model 
fit is determined by structure; the fit indices are only useful in comparing the structure of 
one model to the structure of another.  Having determined through iterations described 
previously that there was no better structure for any of the three populations and that the 
model used was not only conceptually valid but also yielded acceptable and comparable 
fit index values, it was holistically determined that the models are equivalent for both the 
aviation and health care populations.  This determination as validated through the 
acceptable and comparable fit index values of the combined dataset. 
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Table 6. Summary of Hypothesis Testing, Aviation Workplace. 
Hypothesis Description Factors Result 
1 EL ! EWC 
        1a  EL ! EWCF1 Fail to reject H0 
      1b  EL ! EWCF2 Fail to reject H0 
      1c  EL ! EWCF3 Fail to reject H0 
2 EL ! SCli 
 
 
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
3 EL !  SPar  Reject H0 
4 EL ! SCom  Fail to reject H0 
5 EWC ! SCli   
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
6 EWC ! SPar 
 
 
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar Reject H0 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
7 EWC ! SCom 
 
 
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom Reject H0 
8 SCli ! SPar 
 
 
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     8b  SCliF2 !  SPar Reject H0 
9 SCli ! SRE  
      9a  SCliF1 !  SRE Reject H0 
     9b  SCliF2 ! SRE Fail to reject H0 
10 SCom ! SPar 
 
Fail to reject H0 
11 SCom ! SRE 
 
Fail to reject H0 
12 SRE ! SPar  Fail to reject H0 
13 SRE !  OI  Reject H0 
Note. Boldface indicates significant path. 
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Table 7. Summary of Hypothesis Testing, Healthcare Workplace. 
Hypothesis Description Factors Result 
1 EL ! EWC 
        1a  EL ! EWCF1 Fail to reject H0 
      1b  EL ! EWCF2 Fail to reject H0 
      1c  EL ! EWCF3 Fail to reject H0 
2 EL ! SCli 
 
 
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
3 EL !  SPar  Reject H0 
4 EL ! SCom  Fail to reject H0 
5 EWC ! SCli   
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
6 EWC ! SPar 
 
 
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar Reject H0 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
7 EWC ! SCom 
 
 
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom Reject H0 
8 SCli ! SPar 
 
 
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     8b  SCliF2 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
9 SCli ! SRE  
      9a  SCliF1 !  SRE Reject H0 
     9b  SCliF2 !  SRE Reject H0 
10 SCom ! SPar 
 
Fail to reject H0 
11 SCom ! SRE 
 
Fail to reject H0 
12 SRE !  SPar  Reject H0 
13 SRE !  OI  Reject H0 
Note. Boldface indicates significant path. 
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Table 8. Summary of Hypothesis Testing, Both Workplaces. 
Hypothesis Description Factors Result 
1 EL ! EWC 
        1a  EL ! EWCF1 Fail to reject H0 
      1b  EL ! EWCF2 Fail to reject H0 
      1c  EL ! EWCF3 Fail to reject H0 
2 EL ! SCli 
 
 
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
3 EL !  SPar  Reject H0 
4 EL ! SCom  Fail to reject H0 
5 EWC ! SCli   
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 Reject H0 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 Fail to reject H0 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 Fail to reject H0 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 Reject H0 
6 EWC ! SPar 
 
 
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar Reject H0 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
7 EWC ! SCom 
 
 
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom Fail to reject H0 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom Reject H0 
8 SCli ! SPar 
 
 
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar Fail to reject H0 
     8b  SCliF2 !  SPar Reject H0 
9 SCli ! SRE  
      9a  SCliF1 !  SRE Reject H0 
     9b  SCliF2 !  SRE Reject H0 
10 SCom ! SPar 
 
Fail to reject H0 
11 SCom ! SRE 
 
Fail to reject H0 
12 SRE !  SPar  Reject H0 
13 SRE !  OI  Reject H0 
14 Aviation ~ Healthcare ~ Both Fail to reject H0 
Note. Boldface indicates significant path. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to establish the relationship among ethical 
leadership, an ethical workplace climate, and occupational injuries.  The study  
(a) created an empirical model of ethical leadership, ethical workplace climate, safety 
climate, safety participation, safety compliance, safety related events, and occupational 
injuries, (b) evaluated the model on a sample of aviation workers, healthcare workers, 
and the combined dataset, and (c) examined the results using structural equation 
modeling.  A summary of the results is presented for the analyses conducted then the 
conclusions are presented followed by suggestions for future research. 
Discussion 
The method used in this study was a structural equation model for testing and 
evaluating causal relations using a combination of statistical analysis and qualitative 
causal assumptions.  The causal assumptions were based upon previous studies in the 
literature and the operationalization of the factors under investigation was accomplished 
with a hybrid instrument developed from previous studies.  Necessarily, the development 
of a structural equation model is iterative and involves redefinition of the model as the 
statistical analysis informs the quality of the causal assumptions.  As discussed below, 
that was the case in this study as well. 
Population and sample.  Bickart and Schmittlein (1999) have reported that 
response rates have declined for all types of surveys, regardless of subject or delivery 
method.  Groves, Cialdini and Couper (1992) reported that the US population is being 
over-surveyed; the increase in the quantity of survey research being undertaken has 
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resulted in an increase in the number of requests to individuals to complete surveys.  This 
increase in the number of requests is likely to lower response rates, since individuals’ 
overall attitudes toward the survey industry may be unfavorable, and the perception of 
uniqueness to participation in the survey process diminishes.  Low response rates are a 
concern, since answers from survey respondents may differ substantially from those of 
non-respondents, resulting in a biased estimate of the characteristics of the population 
(Bean & Roszkowski, 1995). 
Johnson and Owens (2003) performed an analysis of response rates in audited 
journal articles and found a mean response rate of 17.3% for social sciences and 32.6% 
for health sciences (n = 95).  Over-surveying in a growing number of areas means that 
employees are saturated with questionnaires (Weiner & Dalessio, 2006).  The result is a 
large number of target individuals or firms who are fatigued and therefore, refuse to 
respond to non-essential questionnaires.  At the organizational level, Fenton-O’Creevy 
(1996) examined reasons for non-response in a study that yielded a 33% response rate.  A 
random sample of non-respondents reported various reasons for not responding: too busy 
(28%), not considered relevant (14%), address unavailable to return the questionnaire 
(12%), and cases when it was company policy not to complete surveys (22%).  The 
remaining 24 percent did not state clear reasons. 
Prior work has identified a general decrease in the level of response rate over 
time.  Examining US national surveys, Steeh (1981) found a decreasing response rate 
between the 1950s and the 1970s for a specific population survey.  Baruch (1999) clearly 
identified continuation of the trend in organizational studies.  Cycyota and Harrison 
(2006) document a decline in response rate among surveys targeted at executives.  
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Rogelberg and Stanton (2007) identify a number of factors that may contribute to further 
decline in individual response rates.  These factors include survey saturation due to 
increasing popularity of opinion polls, emergence of additional survey administration 
businesses, and managerial interest in making data-driven decisions. 
In planning for this study approximately 1,000 valid responses were sought and it 
was estimated, based upon the literature in response rate trends, that a six-fold 
oversampling would be sufficient to that end.  As Table 2 shows, the actual response rate 
was slightly lower than the projected 16% response rate.  While higher response rates 
may improve certainty, they do not necessarily reduce bias, nor does a lower response 
rate automatically imply that the results are subject to either selection bias or 
confirmation bias. 
Historically, a survey’s response rate was viewed as an important indicator of 
survey quality.  Many observers presumed that higher response rates assure more 
accurate survey results (Aday, 1996; Babbie, 1990; Backstrom & Hursh-César, 1963;  
Rea & Parker, 1997).  Given the expense, and often impossibility, of measuring the 
relation between non-response and the accuracy of a survey statistic, there have been few 
studies designed with rigor that actually provided evidence of the consequences of lower 
response rates.  In recent years, studies have been conducted, and they are challenging the 
presumption that a lower response rate means lower survey accuracy. 
One finding was reported by Visser, Krosnick, Marquette and Curtin (1996) who 
showed that surveys with lower response rates, near 20%, yielded more accurate 
measurements than did surveys with higher response rates, near 60 or 70%.  In another 
study, Keeter, Kennedy, Dimrock, Best, and Craighill (2006) compared results of a five-
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day survey employing the Pew Research Center’s usual 25% response rate methodology 
with results from a more rigorous survey conducted over a much longer field period 
achieved a higher response rate of 50%.  In 77 out of 84 comparisons, the two surveys 
yielded results that were statistically indistinguishable.  Among the items that manifested 
significant differences across the two surveys, the differences in proportions of people 
giving a particular answer ranged from four percentage points to eight percentage points 
(Keeter et al., 2006). 
A study by Curtin, Presser, and Singer (2000) tested the effect of lower response 
rates on estimates of the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS).  They assessed the impact 
of excluding respondents who initially refused to cooperate, which reduced the response 
rate five to ten percentage points: (a) respondents who required more than five calls to 
complete the interview, reducing the response rate about 25 percentage points; and 
(b) those who required more than two calls, a reduction of about 50 percentage points.  
They found no effect of excluding these respondent groups on estimates of the ICS using 
monthly samples of hundreds of respondents. 
Holbrook, Krosnick, and Pfent (2005) assessed whether lower response rates are 
associated with less unweighted demographic respresentativeness of a sample.  By 
examining the results of 81 national surveys with response rates varying from 5%  
to 54%, they found that surveys with much lower response rates were only minimally less 
accurate.  In the HROs of aviation and health care, the target population has historically 
been asked too frequently to participate in company-wide surveys.  A larger population 
was purposefully selected to ensure that the statistical power of the SEM-PA model was 
achieved.  The factor analysis confirmed the validity of the instrumentation.  Therefore, 
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this instrument’s very high reliability measures of Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .772 
to .869 assure that the lower than historically advocated response rate is acceptable. 
Factor analysis.  Two factor analyses were conducted.  The first analysis was on 
the input variables of ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate.  This analysis was 
to ensure that the two constructs were independent of each other and to determine if 
subscales existed within a construct.  As Table 4 indicates, the constructs of ethical 
leadership and ethical workplace climate are separate and distinct.  Analysis of the ethical 
workplace climate construct revealed four sub-scales: (a) EWCF1, items related to laws, 
rules, and regulations; (b) EWCF2, items related to concepts of ethical good beyond the 
self; (c) EWCF3, items related to ethical issues of self-interest; and, (d) EWCF4, items 
related to an individual’s sense of morality.  This fourth subscale, EWCF4, did not yield 
any statistically significant paths among any of the mediator constructs, safety related 
events, or occupational injuries during modeling of the dataset.  As a result, the EWCF4 
factor was removed from model construction and presentation for the sake of clarity in 
the iterative models that followed. 
The second analysis was conducted on the three mediating constructs of safety 
climate, safety participation, and safety compliance.  Table 5 shows that these constructs 
factor independently with two subscales developing for safety climate: the first, SCliF1, 
related to proactive safety climate issues, while the second, SCliF2, related to outcome-
based safety climate issues. All of these factors were retained and their identification 
contributed to the development and revision of the models below. 
Analysis of variance.  Before modeling was attempted, the hypothesis was tested 
to determine if there were significant differences between the two populations as 
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distinguished by employment condition.  The null hypothesis stated that there were no 
significant differences between aviation and healthcare for each of the items on the 
questionnaire.  A one-way ANOVA was conducted at the item level and is presented in 
Appendix E for transparency, although a per-item discussion of differences was beyond 
the scope of this study, which was limited to investigating the differences between 
populations at the construct level.  Accordingly, an additional one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA was conducted on the ten emergent constructs from factor analysis.  The null 
hypothesis stated that there were no significant differences between aviation and 
healthcare for the ten emergent constructs from factor analysis.  Only three of these 
constructs had significant differences between populations: the first factor of ethical 
workplace climate, safety participation, and safety compliance.  There was a significant 
effect of employment condition on ethical workplace climate for the EWCF1 factor, 
regulations, at the p < .05 level for the two conditions, F(1, 835) = 17.375,  p < .000,  
η2 =.021, indicating a large effect.  Healthcare had a significantly higher mean  
(M = 5.47) than aviation (M = 5.05).  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected.  Both 
safety participation and safety compliance demonstrated significant effects of 
employment condition on them at the p < .05 level for the two conditions, with  
F(1, 835) = 6.859, p = .009, η2 = .008 for safety participation, and F(1, 835) = 20.712,  
p < .000, η2 = .024 for safety compliance.  For safety participation, healthcare again had 
a significantly higher mean (M = 5.07) than aviation (M = 4.89).  For safety compliance, 
healthcare also had a significantly higher mean (M = 6.15) than aviation (M = 5.70).  
Both of these relationships demonstrated medium effect.  Therefore, the null hypotheses 
were rejected. 
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The first factor of ethical workplace climate, items related to laws, rules, and 
regulations, did vary significantly between groups with large effect.  This factor is 
noteworthy as both aviation and healthcare are occupational fields subject to considerable 
external and internal regulation and no significant difference was expected in this factor.  
There were significant differences with medium effects between the groups for the 
mediators of safety participation and safety compliance; however, both of these 
constructs, when modeled, had comparatively low standardized regression weights, 
decreasing their relative importance in the model.  The standardized regression weights 
are presented in Tables E8, E9, and E10 in Appendix E for the aviation, healthcare, and 
combined workplaces, respectively.  The combined dataset was used to validate the 
results of the individual population model structures by providing a baseline model for 
HROs that is undifferentiated by workplace. 
Model revision.  The Amos® SEM software supplies 25 different goodness-of-fit 
measures, the choice of which is a matter of dispute among methodologists.  To the 
extent that there is a research consensus on reporting fit measures, when rejecting or 
failing to reject a model, or when reporting SEM results, multiple measures rather than a 
single measure should be considered.  Kline (1998) in his first edition recommended at 
least four tests, such as model chi-square; NFI or CFI; non-normed fit index (NNFI); and 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR).  In his second edition, Kline (2005) 
recommended reporting model RMSEA, CFI, SRMR, and the deviance (-2LL) or model 
chi-square, its degrees of freedom, and its p value.  Thompson (2000) recommends the 
CFI and the RMSEA as being the most useful measures when assessing model fit. 
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Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen (2008) recommend reporting deviance, or model 
chi-square, its degrees of freedom, and its p value, along with RMSEA and its associated 
confidence interval, SRMR, CFI and a parsimony measure such as PNFI.  This selection 
is based on a review of the literature and on the fact that these indices are the least 
sensitive to sample size, model misspecification and parameter estimates.  Garson (2012) 
recommends reporting model chi-square (CMIN), RMSEA, and one of the baseline fit 
measures, such as NFI, relative fit index (RFI), incremental fit index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI), or CFI; and if there is model comparison, also report one of the parsimony 
measures, PNFI or parsimony comparative fit index (PCFI).  It should be noted that some 
measures, particularly goodness of fit index (GFI), and adjusted goodness of fit index 
(AGFI), are no longer preferred (Garson, 2012).  Additionally, not all fit indices are 
computed by all programs or with all data.  Amos, for instance, will not output certain fit 
measures when data are missing.  Therefore, the electronic instrument used in this study 
forced response to all items and any cases with incomplete items were removed from 
analysis during initial screening of the data. 
Once model parameters were estimated the overall goodness of fit indices were 
considered, beginning with the chi-square, or CMIN, statistic.  While a nonsignificant 
value of CMIN is generally desired, this value is extremely sensitive to sample size, 
particularly if over 200 cases (Garson, 2012).  In other words, the data may fit the model 
reasonably well but the CMIN value, taken alone, could cause a type I error or cause the 
model to be erroneously rejected.  As discussed in Chapter III, the minimum sample size 
for both model fit and power was 400 cases.  The design of the study, particularly 
Hypothesis 14, necessitated a minimum of 800 total cases for the full dataset, rendering 
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the CMIN statistic invalid as a measure of significance.  The CMIN value itself does 
retain utility in showing the incremental improved fit of the model, as seen in Table 5.  
On its own, however, it cannot be used to reject or fail to reject model validity. 
The initial, fully mediated model, shown in Figure 3, failed to produce an 
adequate fit, as evidenced by the fit indices.  This model was based upon the theoretical 
model of Figure 2, informed by the literature, as adjusted for the findings of the factor 
analysis described above.  As described in Chapter IV, significant modifications were 
made to this model in order to improve fit.  The two added and nine removed paths were 
largely the simplification of the relationships among ethical leadership and the mediating 
constructs as well as among the factors of ethical workplace climate and the mediating 
variables.  Comparison of the fully mediated and partially mediated models shown in 
Figures 3 and 4 show this reduction after the addition of paths to the theoretical model 
from factor analysis.  This change from 16 to nine paths directed toward the mediating 
constructs, as well as a removal of paths between some of the mediators, greatly 
simplified the conceptual presentation of the model and improved model fit to near-
acceptable levels. 
The next two modifications were largely incremental, as demonstrated by Table 5.  
A highly weighted covariant path between the two factors of safety climate, SCliF1 
(proactive) and SCliF2, (outcomes) was established, as supported by the results of the 
factor analysis, as well as an unmediated path between the third ethical workplace factor, 
EWCF3, items related to self-interest, and safety related events.  A third, unmediated path 
between the second factor of ethical workplace climate, EWCF2, items related to idealized 
ethos, and occupational injuries, OI, was also created.  The final revision, shown in 
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Figure 6, adds an unmediated path between ethical leadership, EL, and safety related 
events, SRE.  This model provided the optimal fit indices for the dataset with any 
subsequent modifications decreasing overall fit.  A version of the model with the 
dominant paths in bold and non-significant paths removed is shown in Figure 8.  Of the 
17 statistically significant paths in the final model, there are seven paths that are more 
highly weighted than the others and represent the strongest relationships among the 
constructs.  These paths are shown in Figure 9 and are discussed below individually. 
Ethical leadership to occupational injuries.  This path, while not part of the 
study’s hypotheses, shows an unmistakably strong relationship between the constructs of 
ethical leadership and occupational injuries.  The path had a coefficient value of .372  
(SE = .029; C.R. = 13.029; p < .001) for the combined model, slightly higher for the 
healthcare model at .431 (SE = .039; C.R. = 11.395; p < .001), and lower than the 
combined model for aviation, with a coefficient value of .306 (SE = .042; C.R. = 7.182;  
p < .001).  Under leadership that is perceived to be ethical by the employees, there are 
statistically significantly fewer occupational accidents.  An ethical leader has provided a 
safe working environment through his/her policies, procedures, benefit packages, and 
most importantly his/her actions.   
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Figure 8. End-state Model. This model removes the nonsignificant paths and highlights 
those paths with stronger relationships. 
 
 
Ethical workplace climate (regulations) to safety climate (proactive).  This 
significant path, with the highest direct regression weight in the entire model is intuitive; 
that is, that a relationship would necessarily exist between the regulatory aspects of an 
ethical workplace climate and a proactive safety climate.  Because of the highly 
structured, codified, safety-oriented environments of aviation and healthcare this 
relationship was expected.  The path had a coefficient value of .413 (SE = .032;  
C.R. = 13.068; p < .001) for the combined model, slightly lower for the healthcare model 
at .404 (SE = .058; C.R. = 7.764; p < .001), and even higher for the aviation model, with 
a coefficient value of .434 (SE = .039; C.R. = 10.248; p < .001).   
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Figure 9. Simplified Model. This model shows the seven, more highly weighted, 
significant paths present in the data with plain language descriptions of the factors. 
 
 
Ethical workplace climate (regulations) to safety participation.  Although the 
model shows four statistically significant paths to safety participation, only the path from 
the regulatory factor of ethical workplace climate has a significant path.  The path had a 
coefficient value of -.149 (SE = .039; C.R. = -3.792; p < .001) for the combined model, 
slightly higher for the healthcare model at -.063 (SE = .056; C.R. = -1.178; p = .024), and 
much lower for the aviation model, with a coefficient value of -.223 (SE = .053;  
C.R. = -3.999; p < .001).  The path’s weighting indicates that safety participation may 
well be the result of fiat, not choice.  The lack of a path from the other ethical workplace 
climate factors, ideals and self-interest, merits additional investigation. 
Ethical workplace climate (ideals) to safety climate (proactive).  Similar to the 
ethical workplace climate (regulations) to safety participation relationship, the path 
between the idealized aspects of ethical workplace climate and a proactive safety climate 
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is also unsurprising.  The path had a coefficient value of .369 (SE = .030; C.R. = 12.510; 
p < .001) for the combined model, slightly lower for the healthcare model at .289  
(SE = .054; C.R. = 6.186; p < .001), and even higher for the aviation model, with a 
coefficient value of .382 (SE = .039; C.R. = 9.549; p < .001).  For those tasked with the 
implementation, management, and assurance of safety in an organization, however, this 
relationship may be even more important.  While the previous path reinforces the idea 
that good rules lead to good practices this path more clearly demonstrates the core of an 
effective safety culture: the idea that effective, proactive safety is based on principles 
nearly as much as it is on procedures.   
Ethical workplace climate (self-interest) to safety climate (outcomes).  As 
noteworthy as the path from the third factor of ethical workplace climate to outcome-
based safety climate is it is the paths that are not present that merit discussion.  A strong 
relationship between self-interest and outcomes is intuitive; however, this relationship is 
far from ideal for a manager attempting to build a positive, proactive safety culture.  The 
path had a coefficient value of .362 (SE = .035; C.R. = 10.216; p < .001) for the 
combined model, slightly lower for the healthcare model at .287 (SE = .068;  
C.R. = 4.267; p < .001), and higher for the aviation model, with a coefficient value  
of .426 (SE = .043; C.R. = 9.600; p < .001). 
The lack of significant relationships between the ideals or self-interest factors of 
ethical workplace climate and safety participation is somewhat troubling for the safety 
professional.  Safety participation appears to be solely a function of the regulatory aspects 
of ethical workplace climate; that is, safety participation is seen as something to be done 
by compulsion, not by choice.  This same self-interest factor had the only statistically 
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significant path to safety compliance, and even then it was among the weakest in the 
model.  Again, compliance is occurring in the organization not because it is what is right 
for the individual, and not because it is accepted as a universal right but instead because it 
is ordered.  While this compliance is a victory for safety education—the employees see 
the personal safety implications of making the right choice—it does not speak well of the 
overarching safety culture for the organizations participating.  These relationships are 
discussed further in the Recommendations section below. 
Safety related events to occupational injuries.  The path from safety related 
events to occupational injuries was hypothesized and the strength of the relationship was 
expected.  The path had a coefficient value of .371 (SE = .030; C.R. = 12.380; p < .001) 
for the combined model, marginally higher for the healthcare model at .373 (SE = .037; 
C.R. = 9.416; p < .001), and even higher for the aviation model, with a coefficient value 
of .390 (SE = .051; C.R. = 8.479; p < .001).  In a study by Barling, Loughlin, and 
Kelloway (2002), the relationship was even stronger, with a path coefficient of .44,  
p < .01.  This strength may be attributable to the population in their study that was not 
limited to high reliability organizations and focused on workers under the age of 25 in the 
restaurant and hospitality industries (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002).  Potentially 
more appropriate measures of both safety related events and occupational injuries for 
employees in high reliability organizations are discussed further in the Recommendations 
section below. 
Safety climate (proactive) and safety climate (outcomes).  The path from safety 
climate (proactive) to safety climate (outcomes) was not hypothesized and was the result 
of factor analysis identifying two distinct constructs.  The path had a significant 
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coefficient value of .586 (SE = .132; C.R. = -2.455; p < .001) for the combined model, a 
lower significant coefficient value for the healthcare model at -.818 (SE = .312; C.R. = -
2.517; p = .012), and a nonsignificant coefficient value for the aviation model, with a 
coefficient value of -.037 (SE = .140; C.R. = -.271; p = .787).   
The path from safety climate (outcomes) to safety climate (proactive) similarly 
was not hypothesized and again was the result of factor analysis identifying two distinct 
constructs.  The path had a significant coefficient value of .586 (SE = .130;  
C.R. = 4.587; p < .001) for the combined model, a higher significant coefficient value for 
the healthcare model at .822 (SE = .275; C.R. = 3.867; p < .001), and a lower significant 
coefficient value for the aviation model, with a coefficient value of .309 (SE = .142;  
C.R. = 2.147; p = .032).  
The safety climate literature extensively describes the relation between a 
proactive safety climate and an outcome-based safety climate (Cree & Kelloway, 1997; 
DeJoy, 1985; DeJoy et al., 2004; Katz-Navon et al., 2005).  As a result, the strong bi-
directional relationship between these two safety climate factors was not surprising once 
they were modeled.  What was surprising was the lone nonsignificant path between 
proactive and outcome safety climates in the aviation population.  Although the finding is 
inconclusive in the present study, this relationship warrants additional investigation in the 
aviation population. 
Hypothesis testing.  The evaluation of the 14 hypotheses under investigation was 
conducted once a best-fit model for the data had been discerned.  Discussion of the 
significant hypotheses and their practical significance follows. 
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Hypothesis 1.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and an ethical workplace climate for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  No relationship was found among ethical leadership and any of the 
factors of ethical workplace climate for aviation, healthcare, or combined results.  While 
it was believed that factor analysis would demonstrate these two ethical constructs as 
distinct constructs, which it did, it was hypothesized that there would be a significant path 
between ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate.  This significant path did not 
occur.  This result means that ethical leadership, in itself, does not correlate with an 
ethical workplace climate at the plant level of organization. 
This result is a positive finding for large HROs.  The measurement of ethical 
leadership for this study specifically asked the participants to consider their direct-report 
supervisors when responding.  Viewing the consequential nature of the path in reverse, a 
strong ethical workplace climate – in all three factors: regulation, idealized ethos, and 
self-interest – is not subject to the variances of workgroup-level leadership.  Given the 
potential for any organization to experience a bad hire in front-line management positions 
it is reassuring to see that ethically challenged leadership need not degrade the ethical 
workplace culture established by higher levels of management. 
Hypothesis 2.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and a safety climate for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  Ethical leadership was found to be related with only the reactive, or outcome 
based construct of safety climate.  The lack of a statistically significant path between 
ethical leadership and proactive safety climate may seem counterintuitive but it must be 
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remembered that the constructs in these paths represent only the ethical aspects of 
leadership and not leadership as a whole. 
A relationship among ethical leadership and outcomes is understandable; the 
finding that a variation in the perception of a leaders’ ethics does not impact proactive 
safety climate may be related to a number of other reasons.  For example, the immediate 
supervisor rarely sets the elements of a proactive safety climate; these are generally 
established at a higher level of an organization’s structure.  There may also be elements 
of Machiavellianism in the leader’s actions that while perceived as less than ethical by 
subordinates, may yield positive safety outcomes (Collins, 2010). 
Hypothesis 3.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  While this path was significant in the model it was weighted much lower than 
hypothesis eight, the relationship between safety climate and safety participation.  The 
data showed that ethical leadership was a relatively poor predictor for safety 
participation, a finding that invites further study into what motivates safety participation 
in the employees of a high reliability organization. 
Hypothesis 4.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical leadership and safety communication for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  As with safety participation, ethical leadership was found to be a poor 
predictor for safety compliance.  This relationship merits further investigation in a future 
study, as discussed below in Recommendations. 
Hypothesis 5.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between an ethical workplace climate and a safety climate for aviation, healthcare, and 
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combined results.  Through factor analysis, this relationship was shown to be the most 
complex, with six paths among three ethical workplace constructs and two safety climate 
constructs.  Despite this number of paths, only three of these paths were significant.  The 
first significant path, from ethical workplace climate regulations, to safety climate - 
proactive, and the second path, from ethical workplace climate idealized ethos, to safety 
climate proactive, are well supported in the literature and described in Chapter II.  Rules 
and principles are well associated with proactive measures of safety climate.  The 
outcome-based factor of safety climate was only significantly predicted by the self-
interest construct of ethical workplace climate.  In the context of the items comprising 
these subscales, this relationship is expected. 
What was less expected was the absence of significant paths among the remaining 
three combinations of constructs.  The path between the idealized ethos factor of ethical 
workplace climate and the outcome-based factor of safety climate was not significant in 
any model.  While the literature does not address the specificity inherent in the paths 
between factors, this non-significant relationship as well as the one between the self-
interest factor of ethical workplace climate and proactive safety climate may guide the 
formation of a more effective safety climate.  These significant paths, and the absence of 
the others, invite future investigation into the nature of the safety climate construct and its 
role in mediating safety outcomes. 
Hypothesis 6.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between ethical workplace climate and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  Only the first factor of ethical workplace climate, regulations, had a 
significant path to safety participation.  The other examined factors of ethical workplace 
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climate, idealized ethos and self-interest, failed to generate significant paths.  In this 
relationship it appears that ethical leadership, demonstrated by Hypothesis 3, as well as 
fiat, are the only predictors of safety participation for the populations studied.  The lack 
of a significant relationship among the idealized ethos and self-interest factors and safety 
participation should cause safety professionals to consider the antecedents of safety 
participation and its implications for employee motivation toward safety goals and 
outcomes. 
Hypothesis 7.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between an ethical workplace climate and safety compliance for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  Similar to hypothesis six, only one of the ethical workplace climate 
factors, self-interest, yielded a significant path.  As with previous hypotheses, the ethical 
constructs do not appear to be good predictors of these mediating constructs. 
A significant path between the self-interest factor and safety compliance was 
expected and, with its comparatively low weighting within the model, appropriately small 
in effect.  What was unexpected was the absence of significant paths between the 
regulation and idealized ethos factors of ethical workplace climate and the safety 
compliance construct.  These results could be mistakenly interpreted as self-interest alone 
guides safety participation; regulations and ideals have no role.  This would be an error, 
as the three factors exist only within the construct of an ethical workplace climate and not 
as independent constructs themselves.  Nonetheless, a further examination of the 
organizational antecedents of safety compliance is suggested. 
Hypothesis 8.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety climate and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
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results.  Only the second construct of safety climate, outcomes, had a significant path and 
that was among the lowest weightings of the entire model.  The lack of a significant 
relationship between the first factor of safety climate, proactive, and safety participation 
was surprising.  As discussed extensively in Chapter II, the literature has repeatedly 
demonstrated a significant relationship between these two constructs (DeJoy, 1985; 
Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 1980).  Due to the counterintuitive nature of this 
finding, the lack of a significant path should be validated in a future study. 
Hypothesis 9.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between a safety climate and safety related events for aviation, healthcare, and combined 
results.  Both factors of safety climate, proactive and outcomes, generated significant 
paths to safety related events for health care and the combined dataset.  However, these 
paths were the lowest weighted paths in the entire model.   
While this lack of a robust relationship in this model between safety climate and 
safety related events seem counterintuitive, it must be noted that this relationship is as a 
mediator to the ethical constructs and safety related events.  No statement is made about 
the relationship between safety related events and safety climate as an independent 
construct.  The results are only valid in the context of this model that places safety 
climate as a mediator in the relationship among ethical antecedents and safety related 
events.  The unmediated paths that arose through revision of the model, shown in Figure 
8 and listed in Table E11 in Appendix E, are more highly weighted than the mediated 
paths and serve to further depress the weighting of the mediated paths. 
Hypothesis 10.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety communication and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
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combined results.  This relationship failed to generate a significant path and was 
abandoned in the first revision of the model.  A possible area of investigation would be to 
examine this relationship with the significant findings of hypothesis six, where the 
regulations factor of ethical workplace climate predicts safety participation, and the non-
significant findings of hypothesis seven where that same construct fails to predict safety 
compliance. 
Hypothesis 11.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety communication and safety related events for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  While this path was not significant in the model, the result must be 
considered within the context of the model.  Safety compliance did not serve as a 
significant mediator with the exception of the third factor of ethical workplace climate, 
self-interest, and then at a low weighting.  This same predictor, the third factor of ethical 
workplace climate, self-interest, also yielded a significant unmediated path to safety 
related events with a higher weighting than the path to safety compliance. 
Hypothesis 12.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety related events and safety participation for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  Although statistically significant for healthcare and the combined 
dataset, this path had the lowest weighting in the entire model.  While the model invites 
many new questions about the role of safety participation in relation to the other 
constructs, it was expected that experienced safety related events would predict safety 
participation.  The low weighting may be a function of the high reliability organizations 
examined; given a relatively low occurrence of mishaps in the workplace other factors 
would be expected to influence safety participation. 
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Hypothesis 13.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no relationship 
between safety related events and occupational injuries for aviation, healthcare, and 
combined results.  As hypothesized, and supported by the literature (Cree & Kelloway, 
1997; Griffin & Neal, 2000), this significant path is one of the strongest relationships in 
the entire model, on par with the unmediated path from ethical leadership to occupational 
injuries.  Discussed further below, this path forms one of the most important theoretical 
relationships of the model. 
Hypothesis 14.  The null hypothesis tested was that there was no difference 
between populations of high reliability organizations with regard to model fit.  The best-
fit model was initially created with responses from both populations.  When the end-state 
model was determined the model’s structure was examined with each of the employment 
populations independently.  As Table 4 shows, the fit indices were comparable between 
populations.  Most important, however, is that the modification indices for the models of 
each population did not suggest that respecification of the model would yield better fit. 
For some time now aviation and healthcare have been used as validated analogues 
for a number of organizational and behavioral constructs (Helmreich, 2000, 2002; 
Helmreich & Merritt, 1998).  The results of this study build upon that by showing 
equivalent results at the factor level for nearly all of the constructs in the model.  As 
shown in Table E7 in Appendix E, the only ethical construct with a significant difference 
was the first factor of ethical workplace climate, regulations.  Additionally, the mediating 
constructs of safety participation and safety communication showed a significant 
difference between workplace groups.  The outcome constructs, safety related events and 
occupational injuries, did not have a significant difference between the groups.  Thirty-
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nine of the 99 items in the instrument demonstrated significant differences between 
workplaces but these differences were not evident when examined at the factor level, 
except as described above.  These differences all but disappear when observed at the 
model level, as shown in Table 4.  The findings of this study support the use of the two 
HRO populations as analogues for investigations at a conceptual level, but highlight the 
fact that differences may appear at an item level, as demonstrated by the differences 
found when by the ANOVA of individual response items, shown in Appendix E,  
Table E4.  It is recommended that an investigator examine significantly different items to 
ensure construct validity, despite a lack of differences at the factor or conceptual level. 
Conclusions 
The model validated in this study may have organizational implications for 
interventions that target improvements in occupational safety.  At the most fundamental 
level, the results of this study suggest that ethical leadership provides an opportunity for 
enhancing occupational safety through mitigation of occupational injuries but has 
minimal impact upon the broader elements of a safety culture.  Additionally, the results 
of this study suggest that occupational injuries might be reduced in the first instance 
through a focus on safety-related events, which are themselves impacted by perceptions 
of safety climate and perceptions of an ethical workplace climate.  This position is 
enhanced as a substantial amount of variance was accounted for in the two factors of 
safety climate. 
A concern in survey research is the extent to which reliance upon self-report 
measures could pose a threat to the validity of findings.  Pransky, Snyder, Dembe, and 
Himmelstein (1999) suggest that the self-report of occupational accidents may be 
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underreported, yielding a conservative bias.  The self-report of injuries may also be 
appropriate because organizational safety records contain important errors (Eisenberg & 
McDonald, 1988).  According to the cases Eisenberg and McDonald (1988) investigated, 
an over report of safety cases occurred in 15% of the time and an underreporting of safety 
cases occurred in 20% of the time.  Eisenberg and McDonald (1988) also showed that 
there was a systematic error in these situations: instances of over reporting were more 
likely to occur for less serious incidents that did not involve lost time and any of these 
instances did not have to be reported to the organization.  In contrast, unreported 
incidents were evenly divided between those that involved lost time and those that did not 
involve lost time.  Consequently, relying only on organizational records might introduce 
a systematic bias into the data.  Inferences from future research would be enhanced to the 
extent to which data on occupational injuries are derived from multiple sources. 
In sum, similar to previous studies of leadership-based interventions (Barling,  
et al., 1996; Kelloway et al., 2000), the findings of this study provide further support for 
the positive impact of ethical leadership upon occupational injuries.  This study extends 
beyond previous safety-specific transactional leadership based interventions (Zohar, 
2002a, 2002b) by examining the impact of ethical leadership.  This research has 
important implications for both safety researchers and organizational dynamics 
researchers who are interested in ethical leadership based interventions, such as 
inspiration, facilitation, or persuasion (Johnson, 2003). 
While somewhat cumbersome at first glance, the true value of this model lies in 
the ability to tease apart individual relationships for both investigation and 
implementation in the workplace.  Examining couplets of path relationships can allow for 
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improvement of the constituent factors involved.  Most importantly, these paths might 
also be considered in the opposite direction of the model path.  For example, Hypothesis 
6a showed a significant relationship between the regulations factor of ethical workplace 
climate and safety participation.  In the context of the model, measures of that ethical 
factor are seen to have a relationship with safety participation.  In an applied context, a 
manager concerned with measures of safety participation now has an additional 
antecedent to consider to improve measures of safety participation; metaphorically, the 
addition of a new set of tools in that manager’s interventional toolbox.  By effecting 
changes to this ethical factor in the workplace, the manager may see positive changes in 
safety participation but also in the proactive factor of safety climate, as seen in 
Hypothesis 5a. 
The three initial mediating constructs of safety climate, safety participation, and 
safety compliance are essential metrics in the assessment of an organization’s safety 
culture.  The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship among the ethical 
constructs and the outcome constructs of safety related events and occupational injuries.  
It is in these relationships, mediated and unmediated, that the study provides a clearer 
understanding of possible workplace interventions. 
Ethical workplace climate plays a strong role in employee perceptions of an 
organization’s safety climate and, to a lesser extent, perceptions of safety participation 
within the organization.  When mediated by these constructs of safety climate and safety 
participation, ethical workplace climate had little effect upon safety related events.  The 
self-interest factor of ethical workplace climate had a significant unmediated path to 
safety related events while the idealized ethos factor of ethical workplace climate had a 
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significant path to occupational injuries.  Despite these paths, these unmediated paths 
were of comparatively low weight in the model and only marginally higher than the 
mediated paths through the two factors of safety climate, outcomes and proactive.  The 
magnitude of the paths among the varying factors of ethical workplace climate and safety 
climate merits further investigation to arrive at a more complete understanding of the 
relationship between these two constructs.  As with the safety participation example, 
these unmediated paths from the ethical workplace climate factors to the outcome 
constructs provide an additional opportunity for management to decrease the frequency 
of these events – a desirable goal for all levels of management. 
Perhaps the most important relationship to be discerned in this study is of the 
direct, unmediated path between ethical leadership and occupational injuries.  While the 
literature review made a case for the existence of the path, with or without mediation, the 
magnitude of the path weighting is notable.  Virtually equivalent in weight to the path 
between safety related events and occupational injuries, the unmediated path from ethical 
leadership to occupational injuries has important implications and valuable opportunities 
for safety interventions by management. 
The study has shown that the broader elements of a safety culture, represented by 
the mediating constructs of safety climate, safety participation, and safety compliance, 
were only minimally affected by the variances in ethical climate and leadership perceived 
at the workplace or plant level.  Even the unmediated paths among the ethical climate 
factors and the outcome constructs, described above, were of comparatively lower 
weighting.  The finding of an unmediated path between perception of leader ethics and 
injury is as practically significant as it is statistically.  The presence of the perception of 
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low ethical leadership in a workplace unit may present the risk of increased occupational 
injury based upon these findings.  The addition of ethical leadership items from this 
study’s instrument to an organization’s periodic safety climate survey would identify the 
presence and magnitude of this potential risk factor.  This risk of increased occupational 
injury could be mitigated through the administrative control of a change in workplace 
management, ideally in advance of an upward trend in occupational injuries. 
Recommendations 
The results of this study provide support for the impact of both ethical leadership 
and ethical workplace climate perceptions on safety outcomes.  Consistent with previous 
studies (Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996; Kelloway et al., 2000; Kelloway et al., 2006), ethical 
leadership as a form of transformational leadership, has an important effect on 
subordinate perceptions of safety climate, on subordinate perceptions of safety 
participation, and upon the rate of self-reported occupational injuries.  Thus, empirical 
support is provided for the final, partially unmediated model suggesting that ethical 
leadership has a direct effect upon occupational safety outcomes in HROs.  However, 
future research must continue to examine both the direct and indirect effects of both 
ethical constructs on occupational safety outcomes. 
Recommendations for future research.  Several issues should be addressed in 
future research.  First, the data were derived from cross-sectional designs.  Although this 
design is appropriate in the earlier stages of research, the need for longitudinal data on the 
indirect relationship of ethical leadership on occupational safety and injuries is apparent 
if any inferences about causality or mediation are to be justified.  The somewhat cynical, 
outcome based attitudes toward safety reflected in the moderating factors could be 
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expected in an organization with low morale or distrust of management, but a by-item 
review of Table E1 in Appendix E for ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate 
items shows this low morale or distrust of management is not present in the data.  
Correlational studies between job satisfaction and each ethical construct, as well as 
among job satisfaction and the moderators, may provide insight into this issue. 
Second, the issue of perceived selection bias as a consequence of response rate 
must be resolved.  As with all workplace studies, access to a researchable population 
presents many challenges.  This study was fortunate in that high reliability organizations 
are accustomed to introspective analysis by their very nature.  Such a willingness to 
participate may not be replicated in other industries at either the organizational or 
individual levels.  Given the instrument’s complexity and pointed questions about the 
individual’s workplace a lower than normal response rate is to be expected.  Two 
modifications are suggested to improve response rate.  The instrument can be refined to 
examine a smaller set of constructs: ethical leadership, the outcome constructs, and 
perhaps one mediator, for example; in order to decrease balking by participants.  The 
instrument could also be administered under controlled settings to increase the response 
rate.  Care must be taken to ensure that participation is truly voluntary and that bias is not 
introduced as a result of the controls; for example, a mandatory workplace survey 
administered in the employee’s workplace on that employee’s work computer would 
create unacceptable potential for bias given the nature of the items in the instrument. 
Third, other possible predictors, their relationship to the ethical constructs, and 
their net impact in a new model upon the outcome constructs, should be identified and 
examined in future research.  For example, Shannon et al. (1997) identified several 
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workplace practices related to leadership that are associated with a higher injury rate, 
such as the level and use of discipline for safety infractions.  Moreover, Baugher and 
Roberts (1999) studied workers in the petrochemical industry and showed that low job 
control and perceptions of employee overwork contributed to workers’ worries about 
explosions.  This fact is important because the cognitive distractions caused by such 
worries may themselves predict safety performance (Arthur, Barrett, & Doverspike, 
1990).  Investigation of the relationships among these constructs, along with the ethical 
constructs and the outcome constructs can provide further guidance for the targeting of 
limited safety resources for intervention and mitigation. 
Fourth, future research might focus on other potential mediating variables.  
Employees’ trust in management is affected by managerial practices (Mayer & Davis, 
1999) and affected by leadership (Jung & Avolio, 2000), which in turn affects critical 
organizational outcomes (McAllister, 1995).  Likewise, perceptions of fairness are 
associated with transformational leadership (Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999) and 
affect organizational outcomes, such as employee theft and turnover (Greenberg, 1990).  
Thus, the extent to which trust in management and perceived justice mediate the effects 
of ethical leadership and workplace conditions on occupational safety should also be 
addressed.   
Fifth, cross-tabulation of the items with statistically significant differences 
between employee groups should be undertaken.  While the equivalence of the healthcare 
and aviation employee groups was validated at the model and construct level, nearly one-
third of the individual items examined demonstrated significant differences between 
groups. 
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Sixth, the study relied upon counts of occupational injuries to determine 
magnitude within that construct.  Unfortunately, this reliance provides an incomplete 
picture of the construct when seeking practical significance in the workplace.  
Occupational injuries represent the negative outcome of risk where risk, in its most 
simplistic form, is understood to be the product of the likelihood of occurrence of an 
event and its severity.  Clearly, a dozen lost-time injuries due to sprains are practically 
insignificant in comparison to a fatal injury.  The items used in this instrument show 
considerable variation in the severity of reported events; that is, blisters versus fractured 
bone.  Even within an item, such as OI2, cuts or lacerations, the variability can represent 
different practically significant outcomes, such as a paper cut versus a life-threatening 
incision.  The development of a new instrument that considers severity and weights it 
accordingly is warranted in order to develop a more accurate risk profile based upon self-
reported safety outcomes. 
Lastly, additional validation of the safety-related measures is warranted.  More 
specifically, the relevance of the scales differed somewhat for respondents in different 
occupational fields in the study.  Although the use of these scales serves to bias the 
findings conservatively, future research should use occupationally relevant safety 
measures wherever possible. 
Recommendations for practice.  The conclusion that ethical constructs have a 
positive effect on safety outcomes makes a significant contribution to the safety literature 
in several ways.  First, the examination of the effects of ethical leadership on subordinate 
perceptions of safety climate and safety participation is novel within the safety literature.  
This omission is important given the strong association between safety climate and safety 
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participation demonstrated within the model and as components of a robust safety 
culture.  Safety participation behaviors, such as actively promoting safety, becoming a 
safety role model, stressing the importance of working safely, and continually 
encouraging innovative ways to improve safety, are strongly associated with measures 
that impact safety outcomes (Zohar, 2002a, 2002b).  These findings suggest an 
alternative, transformational leadership based approach to safety management within 
organizations that can be specifically targeted at the workplace level. 
Second, the findings also show how factors of ethical workplace climate impact 
both safety related events and occupational injuries with and without mediation.  All 
three factors of ethical workplace climate act upon one of the factors of safety climate 
that, in turn, impacts safety related events.  As previously discussed, these constructs 
were largely immune to variation at the workplace level.  This affords senior 
management an interventional path that can be applied at an organizational level.  While 
the weighting of the paths from these constructs was lower than the unmediated ethical 
leadership path, a measure at the workplace level, an assessment of ethical workplace 
climate provides a secondary method of intervention that can be quantified and may 
provide a baseline from which individual workplace ethical leadership may build in 
defense of negative outcomes. 
Third, the results of the study suggest caution when using the mediating 
constructs to predict the outcomes of safety related events and occupational injuries.  The 
paths between the two factors of safety climate and safety related events were of low 
weighting and equivalent to the weightings of the unmediated paths from each of the 
ethical constructs.  Additionally, the mediators’ safety participation and safety 
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compliance did not yield significant paths to the outcome constructs.  This result is 
practically significant because these constructs are frequently measured together and used 
together as indicators of an organization’s overall safety culture.  From this study, it can 
be understood that the nebulous assertion of an organization having a strong safety 
culture is not necessarily in itself a strong predictor of negative safety outcomes.  
Examination of the antecedents of the mediators, such as the ethical constructs in this 
study, must be conducted in order to target interventional resources. 
Fourth, the strong relationship between ethical leadership and occupational 
injuries provides an immediate and low cost mode of investigation and potential 
mitigation for senior management.  The incorporation of ethical leadership items in 
workplace perception studies may provide early warning of employee perceptions that 
are strongly associated with negative safety outcomes and injury.  These measures of 
perception can be made through both safety climate and job satisfaction surveys as a 
means of informing senior management of the potential for negative outcomes within a 
workplace unit before the events occur.  The knowledge of employee perceptions of 
workplace ethical leadership allows for the deployment of administrative 
countermeasures – up to and including the replacement of the workplace level managers 
involved. 
Fifth, as previously noted, these significant relationship pathways can be explored 
in reverse to great utility to determine appropriate causality post hoc.  For example, if 
collected safety data showed an increase in safety related events and/or occupational 
injuries, an assessment of ethical leadership and ethical workplace climate can be 
conducted – in addition to other measures – to determine the appropriate, or most 
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effective, target for mitigation.  A finding of strong ethical leadership and poor ethical 
workplace climate would suggest that organizational or cultural changes are indicated 
and that an effective leader is present in the workplace despite the overarching 
deficiencies in the organization itself.  Conversely, low ethical leadership values 
accompanied by high ethical workplace climate values may indicate a localized problem 
with an individual leader and mitigated, as appropriate.  Validation of these findings may 
be conducted by analyzing the variance between workgroups and the organizational totals 
for both the ethical constructs and the outcome constructs. 
Finally, the measures of safety outcomes used in this study may not be 
appropriate to all workplace populations; the appropriateness of the safety outcomes 
measured should be considered when attempting to use these recommendations in 
practice.  This study purposefully excluded employee groups deemed less likely to 
sustain the set of injuries under investigation as part of those employees’ normal work.  
While the exclusion of those employee groups prevented bias in the reporting of 
outcomes it also excluded a large number of employee perceptions when the results are 
examined at the organizational level.  For example, the most common occupational injury 
for an airline pilot is a lower back injury sustained while placing or removing their flight 
kit in the cockpit.  It is unlikely that there is any relationship between those injuries and 
their perceptions of the ethical leadership of the airline’s chief pilot, an individual with 
whom the reporting pilot may go years without direct contact.  The removal of this 
potential bias also compromises the overall assessment of the organization.  Conducting a 
retrospective analysis of the injuries and safety related events experienced by each 
workgroup and assessing only those items relevant to the workgroup may rectify 
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concerns about introduced bias.  Validity may then be determined through the items 
common to all workgroups. 
In conclusion, this study showed that ethical leadership is directly associated with 
occupational safety.  In addition, ethical leadership, moderated by safety climate, is 
indirectly associated with safety related events that are directly associated with 
occupational safety.  Future research should assess whether changes in ethical leadership 
are followed by changes in employees’ occupational safety and whether other predictors 
beyond ethical workplace climate are associated with safety related events and, therefore, 
occupational safety.  Researchers may also consider examining alternative financial 
outcomes such as reduced workers’ compensation costs, or the costs associated with time 
away from work as a result of work-related injuries, as well as the use of organizational 
reports of injuries and lost time to validate employee perceptions.  Finally, the findings of 
this research may provide evidence that the ethical leadership behaviors of workplace 
leaders are both directly and indirectly related to positive organizational safety outcomes 
within high reliability organizations.  Still, future research is needed to assess whether 
these findings apply in other settings.  Overall, these findings suggest that organizational 
leaders, safety practitioners, and researchers must recognize the importance of ethical 
leadership and an ethical workplace climate with regard to safety in the workplace. 
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April 15, 2013 
 
 
RE:  Invitation to participate in an anonymous research study 
 
Dear (employee name), 
 
We are conducting an online survey as part of a research study to increase our 
understanding of how workplace leadership and their personal safety experiences are 
perceived and experienced by individuals.  As a member of (organization) you are in an 
ideal position to give us valuable first hand information from your own perspective.  
Although Human Resources is sending you this invitation, (organization) is not involved 
in the collection, analysis, or storage of this information.  The Human Resources 
department at (organization) has agreed to distribute this information to you to protect 
your privacy.  The research team does not have access to your name, workplace, or email 
address.  You will not be asked to supply this information at any time. 
 
The online survey takes around 30 minutes and is completely confidential.  We 
are simply trying to capture your thoughts and perspectives on your workplace here at 
(organization).  Each survey will be assigned a number code to help ensure that personal 
identifiers are not revealed during the analysis and write up of findings.  Our study is 
only interested in the total collected results, not with the responses of any individual. 
 
There is no compensation for participating in this study.  However, your 
participation will be a valuable addition to our research and findings could lead to greater 
public understanding of leadership in the workplace and its role in workplace safety. 
 
If you have any questions about the study, feel free to contact the research team 
directly at freiwald@erau.edu.  Please do not reply to this email, as Human Resources is 
not involved in the administration of the study.   
 
When you are ready to participate in the study, please click the following link: 
 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/SL23BD6 
 
The last day to participate in the study is May 1, 2013. 
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
David Freiwald 
Principal Investigator 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
 
 
140 
 
 
140 
APPENDIX C 
Data Collection Device 
141 
 
 
141 
 
Figure C1. Data Collection Device. 
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APPENDIX D 
Response Items Sorted By Factor 
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Factor 1 
Ethical Leadership 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of ethical leadership 
Source:  Craig and Gustafson’s (1988) 31-item scale of perceived leader integrity. 
© 1988 by Elsevier.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
My supervisor: 
EL1. would use my mistakes to attack me personally 
EL2. always gets even 
EL3. gives special favors to certain “pet” employees, but not to me 
EL4. would lie to me 
EL5. would risk me to protect himself/herself in work matters 
EL6. deliberately fuels conflict among employees 
EL7. is evil 
EL8. would use my performance appraisal to criticize me as a person 
EL9. has it in for me 
EL10. would allow me to be blamed for his/her mistake 
EL11. would falsify records if it would help his/her work situation 
EL12. lacks high morals 
EL13. makes fun of my mistakes instead of coaching me as to how to do my job  
            better 
EL14. would deliberately exaggerate my mistakes to make me look bad when  
            describing my performance to his/her superiors 
EL15. is vindictive 
EL16. would blame me for his/her own mistake 
EL17. avoids coaching me because (s)he wants me to fail 
EL18. would treat me better if I belonged to a different ethnic group 
EL19. would deliberately distort what I say 
EL20. deliberately makes employees angry at each other 
EL21. is a hypocrite 
EL22. would limit my training opportunities to prevent me from advancing 
EL23. would blackmail an employee if (s)he thought (s)he could get away with it  
EL24. enjoys turning down my requests 
EL25. would make trouble for me if I got on his/her bad side 
EL26. would take credit for my ideas 
EL27. would steal from the organization 
EL28. would risk me to get back at someone else 
EL29. would engage in sabotage against the organization 
EL30. would fire people just because (s)he doesn’t like them if (s)he could get  
            away with it 
EL31. would do things which violate organizational policy and then expect  
            his/her subordinates to cover for him/her 
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Factor 2 
Ethical Workplace Climate 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of ethical workplace climate 
Source:  Cullen, Victor, and Bronson’s (1993) 26-item ethical climate scale 
© 1993 by Ammons Scientific Ltd.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
EWC1. What is best for everyone in the company is the major consideration here 
EWC2. The most important concern is the good of all the people in the company  
            as a whole. 
EWC3. Our major concern is always what is best for the other person 
EWC4. In this company, people look out for each other’s good 
EWC5. In this company, it is expected that you will always do what is right for the  
            customers and public 
EWC6. The most efficient way is always the right way in this company 
EWC7. In this company, each person is expected above all to work efficiently 
EWC8. People are expected to comply with the law and professional standards  
            over and above other considerations 
EWC9. In this company, the law or ethical code of their profession is the major  
            consideration 
EWC10. In this company, people are expected to strictly follow legal or  
            professional standards 
EWC11. In this company, the first consideration is whether a decision violates any  
            law 
EWC12. It is very important to follow the company’s rules and procedures here 
EWC13. Everyone is expected to stick by company rules and procedures 
EWC14. Successful people in this company go by the book 
EWC15. People in this company strictly obey the company policies 
EWC16. In this company, people protect their own interests above all else 
EWC17. In this company, people are mostly out for themselves 
EWC18. There is no room for one’s own personal morals or ethics in this company 
EWC19. People are expected to do anything to further the company’s interests,  
            regardless of the consequences 
EWC20. People here are concerned with the company’s interests-to the exclusion of  
            all else 
EWC21. Work is considered substandard only when it hurts the company’s interests 
EWC22. The major responsibility of people in this company is to control costs 
EWC23. In this company, people are expected to follow their own personal and  
            moral beliefs 
EWC24. Each person in this company decides for themselves what is right and  
            wrong 
EWC25. The most important concern in this company is each person’s own sense  
            of right and wrong 
EWC26. In this company, people are guided by their own personal ethics 
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Factor 3 
Safety Climate 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of safety climate. 
Source:  Zohar’s (1980) 10-item safety climate scale 
© 1980 by the American Psychological Association.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
SCli1. My manager is willing to invest money and effort to improve safety in this  
            job  
SCli2. My manager assigns a high priority to safety issues  
SCli3. Workers who work safely have a better chance of promotion here  
SCli4. One of the main factors affecting workers’ evaluation is whether they have  
            been involved in a workplace accident before  
SCli5. Workers who violate safety regulations upset their fellow workers even  
            when no harm is done  
SCli6. The best workers in our job care about safety and want others to behave  
            according to regulations  
SCli7. It is only a matter of time before I’m involved in an accident here  
SCli8. The safety problems in my workplace are rather serious  
SCli9. Time pressure has nothing to do with accidents, there are simply safe  
            workers and unsafe workers  
SCli10. There is little time to be concerned about safety in our work  
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Factor 4 
Safety Participation 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of safety participation 
Source:  Neal et al.’s (2000) four-item safety participation scale 
© 2000 by Elsevier.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
SPar1. I promote the safety program within the organization  
SPar2. I put in extra effort to improve the safety of the workplace  
SPar3. I help my co-workers when they are working under risky or hazardous  
            conditions  
SPar4. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help to improve workplace  
            safety  
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Factor 5 
Safety Compliance 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of safety compliance 
Source:  Neal et al.’s (2000) four-item safety compliance scale 
© 2000 by Elsevier.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
SCom1. I carry out my work in a safe manner  
SCom2. I use all the necessary safety equipment to do my job  
SCom3. I use the correct safety procedures for carrying out my job  
SCom4. I ensure the highest levels of safety when I carry out my job  
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Factor 6 
Safety Related Events 
Items used to measure subordinate perceptions of safety related events 
Source:  Barling et al.’s (2002) 16-item safety related events scale 
© 2002 by the American Psychological Association.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
(Not at all, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Frequently or Always) 
While performing my job I... 
SRE1. Had something fall on me  
SRE2. Overextended myself lifting objects  
SRE3. Overextended myself moving objects  
SRE4. Overextended myself pushing an object  
SRE5. Overextended myself bending or moving in an awkward position  
SRE6. Had my hand contact a sharp object while using or cleaning a piece of  
            equipment  
SRE7. Tripped over an object  
SRE8. Slipped on a slick surface  
SRE9. Was caught in, under or between an object  
SRE10. Was exposed to chemicals, fumes or cleaning solutions without proper  
            ventilation 
SRE11. Was in contact with broken glass 
SRE12. Tripped over something on the floor 
SRE13. Had something roll over my feet 
SRE14. Fell off of something (e.g., ladder, shelf, etc.) 
SRE15. Had clothes caught in something (e.g., a piece of equipment)  
SRE16. Was struck by an object 
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Factor 7 
Occupational Injuries 
Source:  Barling et al.’s (2002) eight-item occupational injury scale based upon Castillo’s 
(1999) description of the types of injuries that young workers experience. 
© 2002 by the American Psychological Association.  Reproduced with permission. 
 
(Not at all, Rarely, Sometimes, Often, Frequently or Always) 
Please indicate how frequently you have experienced each of the following injuries. 
OI1. Strains or sprains  
OI2. Cuts or lacerations  
OI3. Burns 
OI4. Bruises or contusions  
OI5. Fractured bone  
OI6. Dislocated joint  
OI7. Serious muscle or back pain  
OI8. Blisters  
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APPENDIX E 
Tables 
E1 Descriptive Statistics by Item 
E2 Rotated Component Matrix for the Ethical Leadership and Ethical 
Workplace Climate Scales 
E3 Rotated Component Matrix for the Safety Climate, Safety Participation, 
and Safety Compliance Scales 
E4 ANOVA Results by Item between Aviation and Health Care 
E5 Descriptive Statistics for Factors 
E6 Levene’s Statistics for ANOVA of Factors 
E7 ANOVA Results by Factor between Aviation and Health Care 
E8 Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, 
Aviation Workplace 
E9 Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, 
Health Care Workplace 
E10 Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, 
Both Workplaces 
E11 Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model, Significant Non-
Hypothesized Paths 
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Table E1. Descriptive Statistics by Item. 
 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
EL1 Aviation 413 2.94 2.00 2.070 2.74 3.14 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.69 2.00 1.969 2.50 2.87 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.81 2.00 2.022 2.68 2.95 1 7 
EL2 Aviation 413 2.75 2.00 1.898 2.57 2.94 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.59 2.00 1.885 2.41 2.77 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.67 2.00 1.892 2.54 2.80 1 7 
EL3 Aviation 413 3.49 4.00 2.164 3.28 3.70 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.24 3.00 2.159 3.03 3.44 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.36 3.00 2.164 3.22 3.51 1 7 
EL4 Aviation 413 3.47 4.00 2.154 3.26 3.68 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.18 3.00 2.121 2.98 3.39 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.33 3.00 2.141 3.18 3.47 1 7 
EL5 Aviation 413 3.60 4.00 2.216 3.39 3.81 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.41 4.00 2.127 3.21 3.61 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.50 4.00 2.172 3.36 3.65 1 7 
EL6 Aviation 413 2.78 2.00 2.019 2.58 2.97 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.60 2.00 1.948 2.41 2.79 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.69 2.00 1.984 2.55 2.82 1 7 
EL7 Aviation 413 2.43 1.00 1.910 2.25 2.62 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.23 1.00 1.831 2.05 2.40 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.33 1.00 1.872 2.20 2.46 1 7 
EL8 Aviation 413 2.82 2.00 2.021 2.62 3.01 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.59 2.00 1.934 2.41 2.78 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.70 2.00 1.979 2.57 2.84 1 7 
EL9 Aviation 413 2.61 1.00 1.954 2.42 2.79 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.32 1.00 1.800 2.15 2.49 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.46 1.00 1.882 2.33 2.59 1 7 
EL10 Aviation 413 3.09 3.00 2.039 2.90 3.29 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.83 2.00 2.004 2.64 3.02 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.96 2.00 2.025 2.82 3.10 1 7 
EL11 Aviation 413 2.68 2.00 1.957 2.49 2.87 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.53 1.50 1.910 2.35 2.71 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.60 2.00 1.934 2.47 2.74 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
EL12 Aviation 413 2.75 2.00 1.973 2.56 2.94 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.58 2.00 1.936 2.40 2.77 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.67 2.00 1.955 2.53 2.80 1 7 
EL13 Aviation 413 2.59 2.00 1.889 2.41 2.77 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.31 1.00 1.819 2.14 2.48 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.45 1.00 1.858 2.32 2.57 1 7 
EL14 Aviation 413 2.76 2.00 1.992 2.56 2.95 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.44 1.00 1.891 2.26 2.62 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.59 2.00 1.947 2.46 2.73 1 7 
EL15 Aviation 413 2.73 2.00 2.023 2.53 2.92 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.40 1.00 1.893 2.22 2.58 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.56 1.00 1.964 2.43 2.69 1 7 
EL16 Aviation 413 2.83 2.00 2.003 2.64 3.03 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.63 2.00 1.942 2.44 2.81 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.73 2.00 1.974 2.59 2.86 1 7 
EL17 Aviation 413 2.43 2.00 1.779 2.26 2.60 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.28 1.00 1.764 2.11 2.45 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.36 1.00 1.772 2.24 2.48 1 7 
EL18 Aviation 413 2.34 1.00 1.840 2.16 2.52 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.13 1.00 1.711 1.96 2.29 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.23 1.00 1.778 2.11 2.35 1 7 
EL19 Aviation 413 2.77 2.00 1.987 2.58 2.96 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.50 2.00 1.857 2.33 2.68 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.64 2.00 1.926 2.50 2.77 1 7 
EL20 Aviation 413 2.67 2.00 1.946 2.48 2.85 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.39 1.00 1.855 2.21 2.57 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.53 1.00 1.904 2.40 2.65 1 7 
EL21 Aviation 413 3.08 3.00 2.124 2.87 3.28 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.72 2.00 2.053 2.53 2.92 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.90 2.00 2.095 2.75 3.04 1 7 
EL22 Aviation 413 2.73 2.00 2.006 2.53 2.92 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.38 1.00 1.828 2.20 2.55 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.55 2.00 1.925 2.42 2.68 1 7 
EL23 Aviation 413 2.30 1.00 1.771 2.13 2.47 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.16 1.00 1.745 1.99 2.32 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.23 1.00 1.758 2.11 2.35 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
EL24 Aviation 413 2.60 2.00 1.892 2.42 2.79 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.35 1.00 1.831 2.17 2.52 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.47 1.00 1.865 2.35 2.60 1 7 
EL25 Aviation 413 3.14 3.00 2.185 2.93 3.35 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.80 2.00 2.084 2.61 3.00 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.97 2.00 2.140 2.83 3.12 1 7 
EL26 Aviation 413 3.10 3.00 2.092 2.90 3.31 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.74 2.00 2.018 2.55 2.94 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.92 2.00 2.061 2.78 3.06 1 7 
EL27 Aviation 413 2.41 1.00 1.872 2.23 2.60 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.09 1.00 1.765 1.92 2.26 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.25 1.00 1.825 2.13 2.37 1 7 
EL28 Aviation 413 2.56 2.00 1.863 2.38 2.74 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.29 1.00 1.807 2.12 2.46 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.43 1.00 1.839 2.30 2.55 1 7 
EL29 Aviation 413 2.18 1.00 1.681 2.02 2.34 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.05 1.00 1.682 1.89 2.21 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.11 1.00 1.682 2.00 2.23 1 7 
EL30 Aviation 413 2.80 2.00 2.105 2.60 3.01 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.52 1.00 1.983 2.33 2.71 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.66 1.00 2.048 2.52 2.80 1 7 
EL31 Aviation 413 2.46 1.00 1.879 2.28 2.64 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.24 1.00 1.761 2.07 2.41 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.35 1.00 1.822 2.23 2.47 1 7 
EWC1 Aviation 413 4.10 4.00 1.950 3.92 4.29 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.37 4.00 1.845 4.19 4.54 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.24 4.00 1.901 4.11 4.37 1 7 
EWC2 Aviation 413 4.09 4.00 1.895 3.91 4.27 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.38 4.00 1.861 4.20 4.56 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.24 4.00 1.883 4.11 4.36 1 7 
EWC3 Aviation 413 3.84 4.00 1.772 3.67 4.01 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.27 4.00 1.793 4.10 4.44 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.06 4.00 1.795 3.94 4.18 1 7 
EWC4 Aviation 413 4.16 4.00 1.776 3.99 4.34 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.51 5.00 1.719 4.35 4.68 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.34 4.00 1.755 4.22 4.46 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
166 
166 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
EWC5 Aviation 413 5.29 6.00 1.766 5.12 5.46 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.69 6.00 1.499 5.55 5.84 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.49 6.00 1.648 5.38 5.61 1 7 
EWC6 Aviation 413 4.00 4.00 1.893 3.81 4.18 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.18 4.00 1.748 4.01 4.35 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.09 4.00 1.822 3.97 4.21 1 7 
EWC7 Aviation 413 4.83 5.00 1.844 4.65 5.01 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.22 6.00 1.665 5.06 5.38 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.03 5.00 1.766 4.91 5.15 1 7 
EWC8 Aviation 413 5.23 6.00 1.819 5.05 5.41 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.62 6.00 1.605 5.46 5.77 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.43 6.00 1.724 5.31 5.54 1 7 
EWC9 Aviation 413 5.12 6.00 1.856 4.94 5.30 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.52 6.00 1.639 5.36 5.67 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.32 6.00 1.759 5.20 5.44 1 7 
EWC10 Aviation 413 5.41 6.00 1.790 5.24 5.58 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.91 7.00 1.491 5.77 6.05 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.66 6.00 1.663 5.55 5.78 1 7 
EWC11 Aviation 413 4.86 5.00 1.773 4.69 5.04 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.25 6.00 1.670 5.09 5.41 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.06 5.00 1.731 4.94 5.18 1 7 
EWC12 Aviation 413 5.36 6.00 1.712 5.19 5.52 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.80 6.00 1.464 5.66 5.94 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.58 6.00 1.606 5.48 5.69 1 7 
EWC13 Aviation 413 5.29 6.00 1.694 5.12 5.45 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.77 6.00 1.441 5.63 5.91 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.53 6.00 1.589 5.42 5.64 1 7 
EWC14 Aviation 413 4.59 5.00 1.695 4.43 4.75 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.96 5.00 1.652 4.80 5.12 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.78 5.00 1.683 4.66 4.89 1 7 
EWC15 Aviation 413 4.53 5.00 1.772 4.35 4.70 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.96 5.00 1.637 4.80 5.11 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.74 5.00 1.717 4.63 4.86 1 7 
EWC16 Aviation 413 4.46 5.00 1.770 4.29 4.63 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.44 5.00 1.711 4.28 4.60 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.45 5.00 1.739 4.33 4.57 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
167 
167 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
EWC17 Aviation 413 4.16 4.00 1.920 3.98 4.35 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.02 4.00 1.852 3.84 4.20 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.09 4.00 1.886 3.96 4.22 1 7 
EWC18 Aviation 413 3.77 4.00 1.792 3.59 3.94 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.59 4.00 1.844 3.42 3.77 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.68 4.00 1.820 3.56 3.80 1 7 
EWC19 Aviation 413 3.54 4.00 1.917 3.36 3.73 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.41 3.00 1.895 3.23 3.59 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.48 4.00 1.906 3.35 3.61 1 7 
EWC20 Aviation 413 3.64 4.00 1.620 3.48 3.80 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.69 4.00 1.639 3.53 3.85 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.67 4.00 1.629 3.55 3.78 1 7 
EWC21 Aviation 413 3.85 4.00 1.732 3.68 4.01 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.59 4.00 1.789 3.42 3.77 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.72 4.00 1.765 3.60 3.84 1 7 
EWC22 Aviation 413 4.20 4.00 1.660 4.04 4.36 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.15 4.00 1.713 3.99 4.31 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.18 4.00 1.686 4.06 4.29 1 7 
EWC23 Aviation 413 3.95 4.00 1.471 3.81 4.09 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.06 4.00 1.555 3.92 4.21 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.01 4.00 1.515 3.90 4.11 1 7 
EWC24 Aviation 413 3.70 4.00 1.674 3.54 3.86 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.52 3.00 1.764 3.36 3.69 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.61 4.00 1.721 3.49 3.73 1 7 
EWC25 Aviation 413 3.63 4.00 1.588 3.47 3.78 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.43 3.00 1.646 3.27 3.59 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.53 4.00 1.619 3.42 3.64 1 7 
EWC26 Aviation 413 3.93 4.00 1.566 3.78 4.08 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.83 4.00 1.634 3.67 3.98 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.88 4.00 1.601 3.77 3.99 1 7 
SCli1 Aviation 413 4.20 4.00 1.827 4.02 4.37 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.34 4.00 1.876 4.16 4.52 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.27 4.00 1.852 4.14 4.39 1 7 
SCli2 Aviation 413 4.53 5.00 1.826 4.35 4.70 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.80 5.00 1.789 4.63 4.97 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.67 5.00 1.811 4.54 4.79 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
168 
168 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
SCli3 Aviation 413 3.86 4.00 1.779 3.69 4.03 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.08 4.00 1.696 3.92 4.24 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.97 4.00 1.740 3.85 4.09 1 7 
SCli4 Aviation 413 3.26 3.00 1.695 3.10 3.43 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.33 4.00 1.794 3.16 3.50 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.30 3.00 1.745 3.18 3.41 1 7 
SCli5 Aviation 413 4.15 4.00 1.678 3.99 4.31 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.32 4.00 1.601 4.17 4.47 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.24 4.00 1.640 4.13 4.35 1 7 
SCli6 Aviation 413 4.72 5.00 1.741 4.55 4.89 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.96 5.00 1.582 4.81 5.11 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.84 5.00 1.666 4.73 4.96 1 7 
SCli7 Aviation 413 3.00 3.00 1.757 2.83 3.17 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.76 2.00 1.853 2.59 2.94 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.88 3.00 1.809 2.76 3.01 1 7 
SCli8 Aviation 413 3.01 3.00 1.839 2.83 3.19 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.84 2.00 1.961 2.65 3.03 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.93 2.00 1.902 2.80 3.05 1 7 
SCli9 Aviation 413 3.47 4.00 1.784 3.30 3.65 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.42 4.00 1.794 3.25 3.59 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.45 4.00 1.788 3.32 3.57 1 7 
SCli10 Aviation 413 2.95 3.00 1.784 2.78 3.12 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.84 2.00 1.826 2.66 3.01 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.89 2.00 1.805 2.77 3.02 1 7 
SPar1 Aviation 413 4.50 5.00 1.792 4.33 4.68 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.87 5.00 1.710 4.70 5.03 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.69 5.00 1.759 4.57 4.81 1 7 
SPar2 Aviation 413 4.62 5.00 1.743 4.45 4.79 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.02 5.00 1.598 4.87 5.17 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.82 5.00 1.682 4.71 4.94 1 7 
SPar3 Aviation 413 4.96 5.00 1.690 4.79 5.12 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.26 5.50 1.527 5.12 5.41 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.11 5.00 1.616 5.00 5.22 1 7 
SPar4 Aviation 413 4.69 5.00 1.671 4.53 4.85 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.14 5.00 1.487 5.00 5.28 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.92 5.00 1.596 4.81 5.03 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
169 
169 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
SCom1 Aviation 413 5.84 6.00 1.466 5.70 5.98 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 6.24 7.00 1.061 6.14 6.34 1 7 
 
Total 837 6.04 7.00 1.292 5.96 6.13 1 7 
SCom2 Aviation 413 5.58 6.00 1.546 5.43 5.73 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 6.04 6.00 1.192 5.92 6.15 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.81 6.00 1.396 5.72 5.91 1 7 
SCom3 Aviation 413 5.69 6.00 1.602 5.53 5.84 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 6.15 7.00 1.105 6.04 6.25 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.92 6.00 1.391 5.83 6.01 1 7 
SCom4 Aviation 413 5.70 6.00 1.452 5.56 5.84 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 6.16 6.50 1.076 6.05 6.26 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.93 6.00 1.295 5.84 6.02 1 7 
SRE1 Aviation 413 1.54 1.00 0.901 1.46 1.63 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.50 1.00 0.940 1.41 1.59 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.52 1.00 0.921 1.46 1.59 1 5 
SRE2 Aviation 413 1.85 1.00 1.026 1.76 1.95 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.92 1.00 1.134 1.81 2.03 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.89 1.00 1.082 1.82 1.96 1 5 
SRE3 Aviation 413 1.87 1.00 1.063 1.76 1.97 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.91 1.00 1.142 1.80 2.02 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.89 1.00 1.103 1.82 1.96 1 5 
SRE4 Aviation 413 1.83 1.00 1.068 1.73 1.93 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.80 1.00 1.121 1.69 1.91 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.82 1.00 1.095 1.74 1.89 1 5 
SRE5 Aviation 413 1.93 2.00 1.088 1.82 2.03 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.99 2.00 1.202 1.88 2.11 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.96 2.00 1.147 1.88 2.04 1 5 
SRE6 Aviation 413 1.78 1.00 1.120 1.67 1.89 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.70 1.00 1.042 1.60 1.80 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.74 1.00 1.081 1.66 1.81 1 5 
SRE7 Aviation 413 2.01 2.00 1.061 1.91 2.11 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.90 2.00 1.084 1.79 2.00 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.95 2.00 1.074 1.88 2.03 1 5 
SRE8 Aviation 413 1.81 1.00 1.017 1.71 1.91 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.76 1.00 0.995 1.67 1.86 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.79 1.00 1.005 1.72 1.85 1 5 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
170 
170 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
SRE9 Aviation 413 1.46 1.00 0.925 1.37 1.54 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.42 1.00 0.960 1.33 1.52 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.44 1.00 0.942 1.38 1.50 1 5 
SRE10 Aviation 413 1.74 1.00 1.097 1.63 1.84 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.55 1.00 1.000 1.45 1.64 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.64 1.00 1.053 1.57 1.71 1 5 
SRE11 Aviation 413 1.58 1.00 0.959 1.48 1.67 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.54 1.00 0.969 1.44 1.63 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.56 1.00 0.964 1.49 1.62 1 5 
SRE12 Aviation 413 1.84 1.00 1.039 1.74 1.94 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.75 1.00 1.029 1.65 1.85 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.80 1.00 1.034 1.73 1.87 1 5 
SRE13 Aviation 413 1.53 1.00 0.964 1.43 1.62 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.51 1.00 0.999 1.41 1.60 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.52 1.00 0.981 1.45 1.58 1 5 
SRE14 Aviation 413 1.45 1.00 0.859 1.36 1.53 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.38 1.00 0.909 1.29 1.47 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.41 1.00 0.885 1.35 1.47 1 5 
SRE15 Aviation 413 1.57 1.00 0.962 1.47 1.66 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.52 1.00 1.003 1.43 1.62 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.54 1.00 0.983 1.48 1.61 1 5 
SRE16 Aviation 413 1.58 1.00 0.969 1.48 1.67 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.48 1.00 0.958 1.39 1.57 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.53 1.00 0.964 1.46 1.59 1 5 
OI1 Aviation 413 1.76 1.00 0.983 1.66 1.85 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.74 1.00 0.972 1.65 1.83 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.75 1.00 0.977 1.68 1.81 1 5 
OI2 Aviation 413 1.87 2.00 0.948 1.78 1.96 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.83 2.00 0.926 1.74 1.92 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.85 2.00 0.936 1.79 1.91 1 5 
OI3 Aviation 413 1.50 1.00 0.861 1.42 1.58 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.43 1.00 0.831 1.35 1.51 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.47 1.00 0.846 1.41 1.52 1 5 
OI4 Aviation 413 1.82 1.00 1.016 1.72 1.92 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.82 1.00 1.056 1.72 1.92 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.82 1.00 1.036 1.75 1.89 1 5 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
          
  
171 
171 
            
95% confidence 
interval for the 
mean     
    N Mean Median SD 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound Min Max 
OI5 Aviation 413 1.34 1.00 0.849 1.26 1.43 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.33 1.00 0.850 1.25 1.41 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.34 1.00 0.849 1.28 1.39 1 5 
OI6 Aviation 413 1.35 1.00 0.922 1.26 1.44 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.30 1.00 0.809 1.22 1.38 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.33 1.00 0.867 1.27 1.38 1 5 
OI7 Aviation 413 1.81 1.00 1.131 1.70 1.92 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.81 1.00 1.126 1.70 1.91 1 5 
 
Total 837 1.81 1.00 1.128 1.73 1.89 1 5 
OI8 Aviation 413 1.61 1.00 0.978 1.51 1.70 1 5 
 
Healthcare 424 1.48 1.00 0.930 1.39 1.57 1 5 
  Total 837 1.54 1.00 0.956 1.48 1.61 1 5 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
 
 
  
  
172 
172 
Table E2. Rotated Component Matrix for the Ethical Leadership and Ethical Workplace 
Climate Scales. 
 
Item EL EWCF1 EWCF2 EWCF3 EWCF4 
  
(regulations) (idealized 
ethos) 
(self-
interest) 
(personal 
morality) 
EL15 .923 
    EL19 .915 
    EL17 .906 
    EL14 .904 
    EL28 .900 
    EL24 .895 
    EL16 .884 
    EL12 .880 
    EL20 .879 
    EL9 .874 
    EL23 .872 
    EL13 .866 
    EL10 .863 
    EL21 .860 
    EL7 .859 
    EL31 .858 
    EL22 .855 
    EL29 .845 
    EL2 .843 
    EL30 .841 
    EL26 .839 
    EL25 .838 
    EL8 .834 
    EL6 .823 
    EL11 .816 
    EL27 .806 
    EL18 .803 
    EL1 .800 
    EL5 .788 
    EL4 .773 
    EL3 .722 
      
  
173 
173 
Item EL EWCF1 EWCF2 EWCF3 EWCF4 
  
(regulations) (idealized 
ethos) 
(self-
interest) 
(personal 
morality) 
EWC12 
 
.883 
   EWC13 
 
.871 
   EWC10 
 
.848 
   EWC8 
 
.797 
   EWC11 
 
.766 
   EWC9 
 
.745 
   EWC15 
 
.716 
   EWC14 
 
.710 
   EWC5 
 
.676 
   EWC7 
 
.626 .435 
  EWC2 
  
.826 
  EWC1 
  
.799 
  EWC3 
  
.765 
  EWC4 
  
.741 
  EWC6 
  
.684 
  EWC21 
   
.711 
 EWC19 .434 
  
.700 
 EWC17 .405 
  
.687 
 EWC20 
   
.672 
 EWC22 
   
.664 
 EWC16 
   
.660 
 EWC18 
   
.640 
 EWC25 
    
.820 
EWC26 
    
.801 
EWC24 
    
.793 
EWC23 
    
.751 
Eigenvalues 23.55 6.94 4.34 4.06 2.91 
Note.  Extraction method: Principal component analysis.  Rotation method: Varimax 
with Kaiser normalization.  Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
 
  
  
174 
174 
Table E3. Rotated Component Matrix for the Safety Climate, Safety Participation, and 
Safety Compliance Scales. 
 
Item SCom SCliF1 SPar SCliF2 
  
(proactive) 
 
(outcomes) 
SCom3 .915 
   SCom4 .886 
   SCom2 .881 
   SCom1 .834 
   SCli1 
 
.833 
  SCli2 
 
.827 
  SCli3 
 
.807 
  SCli6 
 
.659 
  SCli5 
 
.620 
  SPar4 
  
.848 
 SPar3 
  
.848 
 SPar2 
  
.839 
 SPar1 
  
.798 
 SCli8 
   
.842 
SCli7 
   
.836 
SCli10 
   
.805 
SCli4 
   
.644 
SCli9 
   
.566 
Eigenvalues 3.54 3.33 3.28 3.02 
Note.  Extraction method: Principal component analysis.  Rotation method:  
Varimax with Kaiser normalization.  Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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175 
Table E4. ANOVA Results by Item between Aviation and Health Care. 
 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EL1 Between groups 13.665 1 13.665 3.352 .067 
 
Within groups 3403.886 835 4.077 
  
 
Total 3417.551 836       
EL2 Between groups 5.426 1 5.426 1.517 .218 
 
Within groups 2987.221 835 3.578 
  
 
Total 2992.648 836       
EL3 Between groups 13.683 1 13.683 2.929 .087 
 
Within groups 3900.176 835 4.671 
  
 
Total 3913.859 836       
EL4 Between groups 17.376 1 17.376 3.804 .051 
 
Within groups 3814.581 835 4.568 
  
 
Total 3831.957 836       
EL5 Between groups 7.561 1 7.561 1.603 .206 
 
Within groups 3937.674 835 4.716 
  
 
Total 3945.235 836       
EL6 Between groups 6.642 1 6.642 1.688 .194 
 
Within groups 3285.346 835 3.935 
  
 
Total 3291.988 836       
EL7 Between groups 8.965 1 8.965 2.562 .110 
 
Within groups 2921.683 835 3.499 
  
 
Total 2930.648 836       
EL8 Between groups 10.497 1 10.497 2.685 .102 
 
Within groups 3264.427 835 3.909 
  
 
Total 3274.925 836       
EL9 Between groups 16.942 1 16.942 4.807 .029 
 
Within groups 2943.046 835 3.525 
  
 
Total 2959.988 836       
EL10 Between groups 14.870 1 14.870 3.639 .057 
 
Within groups 3411.749 835 4.086 
  
 
Total 3426.619 836       
EL11 Between groups 4.994 1 4.994 1.336 .248 
 
Within groups 3121.108 835 3.738 
  
 
Total 3126.103 836       
EL12 Between groups 5.909 1 5.909 1.547 .214 
 
Within groups 3188.423 835 3.818 
  
 
Total 3194.332 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
       
  
176 
176 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EL13 Between groups 16.059 1 16.059 4.674 .031 
 
Within groups 2868.930 835 3.436 
  
 
Total 2884.989 836       
EL14 Between groups 20.993 1 20.993 5.571 .018 
 
Within groups 3146.706 835 3.769 
  
 
Total 3167.699 836       
EL15 Between groups 22.482 1 22.482 5.863 .016 
 
Within groups 3201.721 835 3.834 
  
 
Total 3224.203 836       
EL16 Between groups 8.841 1 8.841 2.273 .132 
 
Within groups 3248.595 835 3.891 
  
 
Total 3257.436 836       
EL17 Between groups 4.581 1 4.581 1.460 .227 
 
Within groups 2619.321 835 3.137 
  
 
Total 2623.902 836       
EL18 Between groups 9.580 1 9.580 3.038 .082 
 
Within groups 2632.917 835 3.153 
  
 
Total 2642.497 836       
EL19 Between groups 14.721 1 14.721 3.984 .046 
 
Within groups 3085.138 835 3.695 
  
 
Total 3099.859 836       
EL20 Between groups 16.019 1 16.019 4.437 .035 
 
Within groups 3014.679 835 3.610 
  
 
Total 3030.698 836       
EL21 Between groups 26.123 1 26.123 5.990 .015 
 
Within groups 3641.834 835 4.361 
  
 
Total 3667.957 836       
EL22 Between groups 26.190 1 26.190 7.121 .008 
 
Within groups 3071.002 835 3.678 
  
 
Total 3097.192 836       
EL23 Between groups 4.228 1 4.228 1.368 .242 
 
Within groups 2580.094 835 3.090 
  
 
Total 2584.323 836       
EL24 Between groups 13.482 1 13.482 3.891 .049 
 
Within groups 2893.216 835 3.465 
  
 
Total 2906.698 836       
EL25 Between groups 23.988 1 23.988 5.266 .022 
 
Within groups 3803.324 835 4.555 
  
 
Total 3827.312 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
  
177 
177 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EL26 Between groups 27.294 1 27.294 6.464 .011 
 
Within groups 3525.502 835 4.222 
  
 
Total 3552.796 836       
EL27 Between groups 21.701 1 21.701 6.561 .011 
 
Within groups 2761.611 835 3.307 
  
 
Total 2783.312 836       
EL28 Between groups 15.172 1 15.172 4.506 .034 
 
Within groups 2811.411 835 3.367 
  
 
Total 2826.583 836       
EL29 Between groups 3.390 1 3.390 1.199 .274 
 
Within groups 2361.599 835 2.828 
  
 
Total 2364.989 836       
EL30 Between groups 16.436 1 16.436 3.934 .048 
 
Within groups 3488.878 835 4.178 
  
 
Total 3505.314 836       
EL31 Between groups 10.302 1 10.302 3.110 .078 
 
Within groups 2766.131 835 3.313 
  
 
Total 2776.432 836       
EWC1 Between groups 14.301 1 14.301 3.971 .047 
 
Within groups 3006.860 835 3.601 
  
 
Total 3021.161 836       
EWC2 Between groups 17.325 1 17.325 4.912 .027 
 
Within groups 2945.308 835 3.527 
  
 
Total 2962.633 836       
EWC3 Between groups 39.296 1 39.296 12.365 .000 
 
Within groups 2653.717 835 3.178 
  
 
Total 2693.013 836       
EWC4 Between groups 25.556 1 25.556 8.372 .004 
 
Within groups 2548.719 835 3.052 
  
 
Total 2574.275 836       
EWC5 Between groups 34.360 1 34.360 12.838 .000 
 
Within groups 2234.853 835 2.676 
  
 
Total 2269.214 836       
EWC6 Between groups 7.273 1 7.273 2.193 .139 
 
Within groups 2769.007 835 3.316 
  
 
Total 2776.280 836       
EWC7 Between groups 32.413 1 32.413 10.515 .001 
 
Within groups 2573.955 835 3.083 
  
 
Total 2606.368 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
  
178 
178 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EWC8 Between groups 31.480 1 31.480 10.715 .001 
 
Within groups 2453.251 835 2.938 
  
 
Total 2484.731 836       
EWC9 Between groups 32.317 1 32.317 10.563 .001 
 
Within groups 2554.587 835 3.059 
  
 
Total 2586.903 836       
EWC10 Between groups 52.043 1 52.043 19.223 .000 
 
Within groups 2260.619 835 2.707 
  
 
Total 2312.662 836       
EWC11 Between groups 31.488 1 31.488 10.626 .001 
 
Within groups 2474.404 835 2.963 
  
 
Total 2505.892 836       
EWC12 Between groups 41.596 1 41.596 16.432 .000 
 
Within groups 2113.716 835 2.531 
  
 
Total 2155.312 836       
EWC13 Between groups 49.316 1 49.316 19.979 .000 
 
Within groups 2061.095 835 2.468 
  
 
Total 2110.411 836       
EWC14 Between groups 28.503 1 28.503 10.179 .001 
 
Within groups 2338.163 835 2.800 
  
 
Total 2366.667 836       
EWC15 Between groups 39.067 1 39.067 13.445 .000 
 
Within groups 2426.219 835 2.906 
  
 
Total 2465.286 836       
EWC16 Between groups 0.076 1 0.076 0.025 .874 
 
Within groups 2529.117 835 3.029 
  
 
Total 2529.192 836       
EWC17 Between groups 4.304 1 4.304 1.210 .272 
 
Within groups 2969.613 835 3.556 
  
 
Total 2973.916 836       
EWC18 Between groups 6.277 1 6.277 1.898 .169 
 
Within groups 2761.912 835 3.308 
  
 
Total 2768.189 836       
EWC19 Between groups 3.649 1 3.649 1.004 .317 
 
Within groups 3033.193 835 3.633 
  
 
Total 3036.841 836       
EWC20 Between groups 0.463 1 0.463 0.174 .676 
 
Within groups 2217.869 835 2.656 
  
 
Total 2218.332 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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179 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EWC21 Between groups 13.404 1 13.404 4.322 .038 
 
Within groups 2589.616 835 3.101 
  
 
Total 2603.020 836       
EWC22 Between groups 0.628 1 0.628 0.221 .639 
 
Within groups 2376.554 835 2.846 
  
 
Total 2377.183 836       
EWC23 Between groups 2.744 1 2.744 1.196 .274 
 
Within groups 1915.213 835 2.294 
  
 
Total 1917.957 836       
EWC24 Between groups 6.316 1 6.316 2.134 .144 
 
Within groups 2470.931 835 2.959 
  
 
Total 2477.247 836       
EWC25 Between groups 7.997 1 7.997 3.057 .081 
 
Within groups 2184.593 835 2.616 
  
 
Total 2192.590 836       
EWC26 Between groups 2.276 1 2.276 0.888 .346 
 
Within groups 2140.049 835 2.563 
  
 
Total 2142.325 836       
SCli1 Between groups 4.168 1 4.168 1.215 .271 
 
Within groups 2863.885 835 3.430 
  
 
Total 2868.053 836       
SCli2 Between groups 15.991 1 15.991 4.897 .027 
 
Within groups 2726.342 835 3.265 
  
 
Total 2742.332 836       
SCli3 Between groups 10.630 1 10.630 3.521 .061 
 
Within groups 2520.682 835 3.019 
  
 
Total 2531.312 836       
SCli4 Between groups 0.920 1 0.920 0.302 .583 
 
Within groups 2545.189 835 3.048 
  
 
Total 2546.110 836       
SCli5 Between groups 5.920 1 5.920 2.203 .138 
 
Within groups 2243.767 835 2.687 
  
 
Total 2249.687 836       
SCli6 Between groups 11.886 1 11.886 4.302 .038 
 
Within groups 2307.297 835 2.763 
  
 
Total 2319.183 836       
SCli7 Between groups 12.120 1 12.120 3.715 .054 
 
Within groups 2724.405 835 3.263 
  
 
Total 2736.526 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
  
180 
180 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
SCli8 Between groups 6.055 1 6.055 1.675 .196 
 
Within groups 3019.352 835 3.616 
  
 
Total 3025.407 836       
SCli9 Between groups 0.683 1 0.683 0.213 .644 
 
Within groups 2672.094 835 3.200 
  
 
Total 2672.777 836       
SCli10 Between groups 2.734 1 2.734 0.839 .360 
 
Within groups 2720.803 835 3.258 
  
 
Total 2723.536 836       
SPar1 Between groups 27.406 1 27.406 8.937 .003 
 
Within groups 2560.582 835 3.067 
  
 
Total 2587.988 836       
SPar2 Between groups 32.906 1 32.906 11.788 .001 
 
Within groups 2330.924 835 2.792 
  
 
Total 2363.830 836       
SPar3 Between groups 19.813 1 19.813 7.646 .006 
 
Within groups 2163.631 835 2.591 
  
 
Total 2183.443 836       
SPar4 Between groups 42.637 1 42.637 17.068 .000 
 
Within groups 2085.839 835 2.498 
  
 
Total 2128.476 836       
SCom1 Between groups 33.933 1 33.933 20.812 .000 
 
Within groups 1361.432 835 1.630 
  
 
Total 1395.364 836       
Scom2 Between groups 43.622 1 43.622 22.967 .000 
 
Within groups 1585.929 835 1.899 
  
 
Total 1629.551 836       
SCom3 Between groups 43.996 1 43.996 23.345 .000 
 
Within groups 1573.641 835 1.885 
  
 
Total 1617.637 836       
SCom4 Between groups 43.024 1 43.024 26.452 .000 
 
Within groups 1358.094 835 1.626 
  
 
Total 1401.118 836       
SRE1 Between groups 0.297 1 0.297 0.350 .554 
 
Within groups 708.499 835 0.849 
  
 
Total 708.796 836       
SRE2 Between groups 0.952 1 0.952 0.813 .368 
 
Within groups 977.715 835 1.171 
  
 
Total 978.667 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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181 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
SRE3 Between groups 0.441 1 0.441 0.362 .548 
 
Within groups 1017.447 835 1.218 
  
 
Total 1017.888 836       
SRE4 Between groups 0.171 1 0.171 0.143 .706 
 
Within groups 1001.494 835 1.199 
  
 
Total 1001.665 836       
SRE5 Between groups 0.899 1 0.899 0.683 .409 
 
Within groups 1098.800 835 1.316 
  
 
Total 1099.699 836       
SRE6 Between groups 1.391 1 1.391 1.190 .276 
 
Within groups 976.308 835 1.169 
  
 
Total 977.699 836       
SRE7 Between groups 2.693 1 2.693 2.339 .127 
 
Within groups 961.395 835 1.151 
  
 
Total 964.088 836       
SRE8 Between groups 0.416 1 0.416 0.411 .522 
 
Within groups 844.304 835 1.011 
  
 
Total 844.719 836       
SRE9 Between groups 0.197 1 0.197 0.222 .638 
 
Within groups 742.006 835 0.889 
  
 
Total 742.203 836       
SRE10 Between groups 7.466 1 7.466 6.781 .009 
 
Within groups 919.289 835 1.101 
  
 
Total 926.755 836       
SRE11 Between groups 0.350 1 0.350 0.376 .540 
 
Within groups 776.317 835 0.930 
  
 
Total 776.667 836       
SRE12 Between groups 1.795 1 1.795 1.679 .195 
 
Within groups 892.270 835 1.069 
  
 
Total 894.065 836       
SRE13 Between groups 0.090 1 0.090 0.094 .760 
 
Within groups 804.909 835 0.964 
  
 
Total 804.999 836       
SRE14 Between groups 0.906 1 0.906 1.157 .282 
 
Within groups 653.890 835 0.783 
  
 
Total 654.796 836       
SRE15 Between groups 0.430 1 0.430 0.445 .505 
 
Within groups 807.228 835 0.967 
  
 
Total 807.658 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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182 
    
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
SRE16 Between groups 1.991 1 1.991 2.147 .143 
 
Within groups 774.542 835 0.928 
  
 
Total 776.533 836       
OI1 Between groups 0.081 1 0.081 0.085 .771 
 
Within groups 797.728 835 0.955 
  
 
Total 797.809 836       
OI2 Between groups 0.402 1 0.402 0.458 .499 
 
Within groups 732.630 835 0.877 
  
 
Total 733.032 836       
OI3 Between groups 0.946 1 0.946 1.322 .250 
 
Within groups 597.400 835 0.715 
  
 
Total 598.346 836       
OI4 Between groups 0.005 1 0.005 0.004 .948 
 
Within groups 897.114 835 1.074 
  
 
Total 897.118 836       
OI5 Between groups 0.054 1 0.054 0.074 .785 
 
Within groups 602.608 835 0.722 
  
 
Total 602.662 836       
OI6 Between groups 0.610 1 0.610 0.811 .368 
 
Within groups 627.347 835 0.751 
  
 
Total 627.957 836       
OI7 Between groups 0.004 1 0.004 0.003 .954 
 
Within groups 1063.410 835 1.274 
  
 
Total 1063.415 836       
OI8 Between groups 3.480 1 3.480 3.822 .051 
 
Within groups 760.264 835 0.910 
    Total 763.744 836       
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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Table E5. Descriptive Statistics for Factors. 
 
    N Mean Median SD Min Max 
EL Aviation 413 2.77 2.39 1.721 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 2.52 1.95 1.654 1 7 
 
Total 837 2.65 2.06 1.691 1 7 
EWCF1 Aviation 413 5.05 5.30 1.457 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.47 5.80 1.251 1 7 
 
Total 837 5.26 5.60 1.372 1 7 
EWCF2 Aviation 413 4.17 4.00 1.551 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.49 4.50 1.441 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.33 4.33 1.504 1 7 
EWCF3 Aviation 413 3.95 4.00 1.342 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.84 4.00 1.334 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.89 4.00 1.338 1 7 
EWCF4 Aviation 413 3.80 4.00 1.331 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.71 4.00 1.360 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.76 4.00 1.346 1 7 
SCLIF1 Aviation 413 4.29 4.20 1.465 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 4.50 4.60 1.350 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.40 4.40 1.411 1 7 
SCLIF2 Aviation 413 3.14 3.00 1.341 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 3.04 2.80 1.389 1 7 
 
Total 837 3.09 3.00 1.366 1 7 
SPAR Aviation 413 4.69 5.00 1.545 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 5.07 5.00 1.381 1 7 
 
Total 837 4.89 5.00 1.476 1 7 
SCOM Aviation 413 5.70 6.00 1.412 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 6.15 6.50 1.041 1 7 
  Total 837 5.93 6.25 1.257 1 7 
SRE Aviation 413 1.71 1.38 .874 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 1.66 1.38 .872 1 7 
 
Total 837 1.69 1.38 .873 1 7 
OI Aviation 413 1.64 1.38 .810 1 7 
 
Healthcare 424 1.59 1.38 .791 1 7 
  Total 837 1.61 1.38 .800 1 7 
Note: Boldfaced items indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups. 
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Table E6. Levene’s Statistics for ANOVA of Factors. 
 
Factor 
Levene’s 
statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
EL  4.458 1 835 .035 
EWCF1 11.246 1 835 .001 
EWCF2 0.075 1 835 .784 
EWCF3 0.002 1 835 .968 
SCliF1 0.088 1 835 .766 
SCliF2 0.337 1 835 .562 
SPar  0.160 1 835 .690 
SCom  34.767 1 835 .000 
SRE  6.962 1 835 .008 
OI  1.172 1 835 .279 
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Table E7. ANOVA Results by Factor between Aviation and Health Care. 
 
Factor   
Sum of 
squares df 
Mean 
square F Sig. 
EL  Between groups 1.984 1 1.984 1.986 .159 
 
Within groups 834.016 835 0.999 
  
 
Total 836 836       
EWCF1 Between groups 17.375 1 17.375 17.722 .000 
 
Within groups 818.625 835 0.980 
  
 
Total 836 836       
EWCF2 Between groups 1.855 1 1.855 1.857 .173 
 
Within groups 834.145 835 0.999 
  
 
Total 836 836       
EWCF3 Between groups 0.260 1 0.260 0.260 .610 
 
Within groups 835.740 835 1.001 
  
 
Total 836 836       
SCliF1 Between groups 0.473 1 0.473 0.472 .492 
 
Within groups 835.527 835 1.001 
  
 
Total 836 836       
SCliF2 Between groups 0.315 1 0.315 0.314 .575 
 
Within groups 835.685 835 1.001 
  
 
Total 836 836       
SPar Between groups 6.811 1 6.811 6.859 .009 
 
Within groups 829.189 835 0.993 
  
 
Total 836 836       
SCom  Between groups 20.235 1 20.235 20.712 .000 
 
Within groups 815.765 835 0.977 
  
 
Total 836 836       
SRE  Between groups 1.060 1 1.060 1.060 .304 
 
Within groups 834.940 835 1.000 
  
 
Total 836 836       
OI  Between groups 0.631 1 0.631 0.631 .427 
 
Within groups 835.369 835 1.000 
    Total 836 836       
Note: Boldfaced factors indicate significant ANOVA findings between groups.  
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Table E8. Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, 
Aviation Workplace. 
 
Hypothesis Description Factors Estimate S.E. C.R. p 
1 EL ! EWC      
     1a  EL ! EWCF1 .034 .050 .686 .492 
     1b  EL ! EWCF2 -.027 .048 -.551 .582 
     1c  EL ! EWCF3 -.062 .048 -1.268 .205 
2 EL ! SCli      
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 -.315 .067 -4.441 .301 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 .284 .049 5.531 *** 
3 EL !  SPar  -.223 .053 -3.999 *** 
4 EL ! SCom  -.059 .049 -1.311 .190 
5 EWC ! SCli      
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 .434 .039 10.248 *** 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 .382 .039 9.549 *** 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 -.298 .075 -3.991 .142 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 -.090 .063 -1.436 .151 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 -.088 .060 -1.469 .149 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 .426 .043 9.600 *** 
6 EWC ! SPar      
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar .266 .053 4.708 *** 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar .170 .051 3.350 .431 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar -.078 .057 -1.371 .170 
7 EWC ! SCom      
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom .380 .048 7.930 .190 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom .056 .050 1.118 .263 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom .145 .050 3.198 .001 
8 SCli ! SPar      
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar -.036 .060 -.602 .547 
     8b  SCliF2 !  SPar .222 .061 3.628 *** 
9 SCli ! SRE      
     9a  SCliF1 !  SRE -.116 .049 -2.225 .026 
     9b  SCliF2 ! SRE -.044 .063 -.642 .521 
10 SCom ! SPar  -.048 .045 -1.049 .294 
11 SCom ! SRE  -.678 .040 -1.952 .051 
12 SRE ! SPar  .058 .054 1.179 .238 
13 SRE !  OI  .390 .051 8.479 *** 
Note. *** p < .001; Boldface indicates significant path. 
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Table E9. Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, 
Healthcare Workplace. 
 
Hypothesis Description Factors Estimate S.E. C.R. p 
1 EL ! EWC      
     1a  EL ! EWCF1 -.025 .047 -.505 .614 
     1b  EL ! EWCF2 .034 .050 .695 .485 
     1c  EL ! EWCF3 .065 .050 1.339 .180 
2 EL ! SCli      
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 -.592 .132 -4.492 .053 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 .116 .101 1.190 .023 
3 EL !  SPar  -.063 .056 -1.178 .024 
4 EL ! SCom  -.116 .039 -2.968 .301 
5 EWC ! SCli      
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 .404 .058 7.764 *** 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 .289 .054 6.186 *** 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 -.552 .125 -4.433 .071 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 .249 .135 1.894 .065 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 .293 .123 2.380 .064 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 .287 .068 4.267 *** 
6 EWC ! SPar      
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar .257 .058 4.832 *** 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar .068 .051 1.347 .178 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar -.152 .054 -2.812 .054 
7 EWC ! SCom      
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom .352 .040 8.716 .081 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom .037 .038 .976 .329 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom .093 .038 2.113 .035 
8 SCli ! SPar      
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar -.295 .054 -5.510 .140 
     8b  SCliF2 ! SPar .020 .062 .329 .742 
9 SCli ! SRE      
     9a  SCliF1 !  SRE -.076 .054 -1.456 .015 
     9b  SCliF2 !  SRE .219 .071 3.341 *** 
10 SCom ! SPar  -.261 .060 -4.378 .412 
11 SCom ! SRE  -.064 .060 -1.064 .287 
12 SRE !  SPar  .122 .045 2.530 .011 
13 SRE !  OI  .373 .037 9.416 *** 
Note. *** p < .001; Boldface indicates significant path. 
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Table E10. Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model by Hypothesis, Both 
Workplaces. 
 
Hypothesis Description Factors Estimate S.E. C.R. p 
1 EL ! EWC      
     1a  EL ! EWCF1 .000 .035 .000 1.000 
     1b  EL ! EWCF2 .000 .035 .000 1.000 
     1c  EL ! EWCF3 .000 .035 .000 1.000 
2 EL ! SCli      
     2a  EL ! SCliF1 -.394 .061 5.139 .106 
     2b  EL !  SCliF2 .226 .044 5.139 *** 
3 EL !  SPar  -.149 .039 -3.792 *** 
4 EL ! SCom  -.095 .031 -3.038 .203 
5 EWC ! SCli      
     5a  EWCF1 !  SCliF1 .413 .032 13.068 *** 
     5b  EWCF2 !  SCliF1 .369 .030 12.510 *** 
     5c  EWCF3 ! SCliF1 .388 .063 -6.169 .251 
     5d  EWCF1 ! SCliF2 .037 .057 .648 .517 
     5e  EWCF2 ! SCliF2 .068 .054 1.251 .211 
     5f  EWCF3 !  SCliF2 .362 .035 10.216 *** 
6 EWC ! SPar      
     6a  EWCF1 !  SPar .278 .040 7.016 *** 
     6b  EWCF2 ! SPar .122 .037 3.314 .072 
     6c  EWCF3 ! SPar -.105 .040 -2.637 .080 
7 EWC ! SCom      
     7a  EWCF1 ! SCom .388 .031 12.342 .087 
     7b  EWCF3 ! SCom .051 .031 1.618 .106 
     7c  EWCF3 !  SCom .118 .031 3.764 *** 
8 SCli ! SPar      
     8a  SCliF1 ! SPar -.173 .041 -4.214 .060 
     8b  SCliF2 !  SPar .116 .044 2.635 .008 
9 SCli ! SRE      
     9a  SCliF1 !  SRE -.080 .037 -2.167 .030 
     9b  SCliF2 !  SRE .097 .047 2.052 .040 
10 SCom ! SPar  -.112 .037 -3.047 .210 
11 SCom ! SRE  -.060 .034 -1.763 .078 
12 SRE !  SPar  .078 .035 2.227 .026 
13 SRE !  OI  .371 .030 12.380 *** 
Note. *** p < .001; Boldface indicates significant path 
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Table E11. Standardized Regression Weights for the Best-Fit Model, Significant Non-
Hypothesized Paths. 
 
Workplace Description Estimate S.E. C.R. p 
Aviation EL ! SRE .186 .049 3.356 *** 
 EL ! OI .306 .042 7.182 *** 
 
EWCF2 ! OI .119 .042 2.843 .004 
 
EWCF3 ! SRE .266 .053 4.562 *** 
 
SCliF1 ! SCliF2 -.037 .140 -.271 .787 
 
SCliF2 ! SCliF1 .309 .142 2.147 .032 
Healthcare EL ! SRE .015 .061 .267 .007 
 EL ! OI .431 .039 11.395 *** 
 EWCF2 ! OI .141 .038 3.774 *** 
 EWCF3 ! SRE .085 .059 1.568 .011 
 SCliF1 ! SCliF2 -.818 .312 -2.517 .012 
 SCliF2 ! SCliF1 .822 .275 3.867 *** 
Both EL ! SRE .095 .039 2.428 .015 
 EL ! OI .372 .029 13.029 *** 
 EWCF2 ! OI .128 .028 4.553 *** 
 EWCF3 ! SRE .164 .040 4.132 *** 
 SCliF1 ! SCliF2 .586 .132 -2.455 *** 
 
SCliF2 ! SCliF1 .586 .130 4.587 *** 
Note.  *** p < .001; The italicized path between SCliF1 and SCliF2 is significant in the 
model of all workplaces and for the healthcare workplace only model but is not 
significant for the aviation workplace only model 
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APPENDIX F 
Permission to Use Copyrighted Material 
F1 Permission to use ethical leadership scale 
F2 Permission to use safety participation and safety compliance scales 
F3 Permission to use ethical workplace climate scale 
F4 Permission to use safety related events and occupational injuries scales 
F5 Permission to use safety climate scale 
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Figure F1. Permission to use ethical leadership scale. 
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Figure F2. Permission to use safety participation and safety compliance scales. 
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Figure F3. Permission to use ethical workplace climate scale. 
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Figure F4. Permission to use safety related events and occupational injuries scales. 
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Figure F5. Permission to use safety climate scale. 
 
 
